The government’s claim of defendant’s abandonment came as a result of defendant’s disavowal of ownership of a duffle bag full of cash after it was illegally seized. That is not abandonment, and the motion to suppress is granted. The exclusionary rule needs to apply to deter such actions. United States v. Templeton, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87616 (D. Ariz. August 2, 2010):

An "abandonment must be voluntary, and an abandonment that results from [a] Fourth Amendment violation cannot be voluntary." United States v. Stephens, 206 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, the officers conducted an illegal search of the vehicle and duffle bag and then asked whether the evidence found during that search belonged to Templeton. Templeton stated it did not, but that abandonment was involuntary as a matter of law. See United States v. Nicholson, 144 F.3d 632, 640 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding abandonment involuntary as a matter of law when the abandonment occurred after officers' Fourth Amendment violations). It would undermine one of the core purposes of the exclusionary rule if the government could conduct illegal searches, confront individuals with the fruits of those searches, and then rely on the illegally obtained evidence if the individual stated the evidence did not belong to him. See Crawford, 372 F.3d at 1054 (purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct). Accepting the United States' position would, in effect, provide an incentive for the government to conduct illegal searches in the hopes that a suspect will disclaim ownership of the evidence illegally discovered. 2The Court cannot encourage such actions. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700, 172 L. Ed. 2d 496 (2009) (exclusionary rule should be applied when it will deter future Fourth Amendment violations).

Defendant’s right wheels briefly touching the fog line was not a violation of Nebraska law, so the stop was invalid. United States v. Magallanes, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87836 (D. Neb. June 15, 2010).*

On an arrest of co-conspirators two blocks away from defendant’s house, officers returned to the house to conduct an immediate warrantless entry. They had probable cause for the search, and, although a search warrant had not been issued, “[t]he facts in this case present a textbook example of the proper application of the independent source doctrine.” United States v. Martinez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88282 (S.D. Fla. August 26, 2010).*

Based on these same circumstances, and as per Murray, the independent source doctrine applies. We will assume that the agents' entry into the apartment following the defendants' arrest was illegal under the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, paraphrasing the Supreme Court, knowledge that the cocaine and paraphernalia were inside the apartment was assuredly acquired at the time of the unlawful entry. But it was also later acquired at the time of entry pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant, and if that later acquisition was not the result of the earlier entry there is also no reason here why the independent source doctrine should not apply.

A Tennessee General Sessions court judge was not a court of record, but a search warrant issued by that court that results in evidence in federal court is not subject to suppression for that reason alone under Rule 41. United States v. Green, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88325 (E.D. Tenn. July 2, 2010):

There was no evidence presented to support a finding that the search warrant would not have been issued had Johnson gone to a federal magistrate judge or that the search would have been less abrasive had he done so. In addition, there is no evidence of intentional or deliberate disregard of Rule 41. Johnson testified he routinely conducts narcotics investigations as a detective for the Marion County Sheriff's Department and, in doing so, he routinely obtains search warrants from the Marion County General Sessions Judge. The investigation involving Charles Green was initiated as part of his duties with the Marion County Sheriff's Department, and Johnson was simply following his normal routine in obtaining the search warrant at issue from the General Sessions Judge. There was no intentional attempt to skirt Rule 41. Accordingly, even if Rule 41 did apply, the exclusionary rule does not.

The IP address associated with a house and a subscriber is nexus for a search warrant for the house when child pornography is associated with the IP address. Also, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information under the Indiana Constitution, which has already been decided against him there. Rader v. State, 2010 Ind. App. LEXIS 1581 (August 24, 2010):

Here, the probable cause affidavit explained that the subpoena return from Yahoo! revealed that the account for "monty20064" was registered in Monty Rader's name, and further listed the IP address used to log in to the account on the dates in question. These assertions are supported by the record. The probable cause affidavit further explained that the subpoena return from the ISP for the relevant IP address indicated that the same IP address that had been used to log in to the monty20064 account was "associated with" the address 829 East Washington Street in Greenfield, which the affidavit further explained was Rader's home address. Appellant's App. p. 149. This too is supported by the materials in the record.

The defendant’s probation search was called an “administrative search,” so you know where the case was going. The merits of the search was not at issue. United States v. Gavin, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18013 (11th Cir. August 27, 2010) (unpublished).*

People v. Short, 2010 Mich. App. LEXIS 1613 (August 26, 2010):

A disputed search of defendant's vehicle after defendant was arrested and placed in the back of a police car raises a Fourth Amendment issue of first impression under Michigan law left unresolved by our Court's recent opinion in People v Mungo, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d___ (2010). In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v Gant, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S Ct 1710, 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009), which abrogated the well-established rule in New York v Belton, 453 U.S. 454; 101 S Ct 2860; 69 L Ed 2d 768 (1981) and its progeny, we must consider whether an officer's good faith reliance on case law that is later overturned may form a proper basis to avoid the operation of the exclusionary rule. For the reasons explained below, and pursuant to the reasoning and rationale of rulings from the Tenth and Eleventh federal circuits, we hold that the good faith exception applies and the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress.

Defendant’s stop by an off-duty law enforcement officer driving home who was outside her jurisdiction was valid under Virginia v. Moore. She called for assistance in handling a DWI, and a state trooper told her to stop the car. There is a sliding scale of exigency in DWI cases. State v. Stapa, 2010 La. App. LEXIS 1187 (2d Cir. June 9, 2010):

In Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10 (2009) Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia joined, dissented from the denial of certiorari. Justice Roberts observed:

There is no question that drunk driving is a serious and potentially deadly crime, as our cases have repeatedly emphasized. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990) ("No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the Nation's roads are legion"). The imminence of the danger posed by drunk drivers exceeds that at issue in other types of cases. In a case like (Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266) the police can often observe the subject of a tip and step in before actual harm occurs; with drunk driving, such a wait-and-see approach may prove fatal. Drunk driving is always dangerous, as it is occurring. This Court has in fact recognized that the dangers posed by drunk drivers are unique, frequently upholding anti-drunk-driving policies that might be constitutionally problematic in other, less exigent circumstances.

Considering the especially grave and imminent dangers posed by drunk driving; the enhanced reliability and training of the Greenwood officer; that she was in a marked police vehicle; that she was driving behind defendant and observed his driving; that she contacted a state trooper with jurisdiction and was told to stop defendant; that there were exigent circumstances; that the trooper was at the stop within seconds; that traffic stops are typically less invasive than searches or seizures of individuals on foot; and the diminished expectation of privacy enjoyed by individuals driving their cars on public roads, we find that the stop by the Greenwood officer did not violate the constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures.

[Well, then, what about murder and rape? Really big drug cases? Meth labs? Firearms?]

Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1083 (2010):

In the Information Age, an increasing amount of personal information is contained in records maintained by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), phone companies, cable companies, merchants, bookstores, website, hotels, landlords, employers and private sector entities. Many private sector entities are beginning to aggregate the information in these records to create extensive digital dossiers.

The data in these digital dossiers increasingly flows from the private sector to the government, particularly for law enforcement use. Law enforcement agencies have long sought personal information about individuals from various third parties to investigate fraud, white-collar crime, drug trafficking, computer crime, child pornography, and other types of criminal activity. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the impetus for the government to gather personal information has greatly increased, since such data can be useful to track down terrorists and to profile airline passengers for more thorough searches. Detailed records of an individual’s reading materials, purchases, diseases, and website activity enable the government to assemble a profile of an individual’s finances, health, psychology, beliefs, politics, interests, and lifestyle. This data can unveil a person’s anonymous speech and personal associations.

Defendant was arrested on a warrant, and somebody yelled out “It’s in his crotch!” The situation was tense, and the officers conducted a strip search to recover what was there. It was indoors and not unreasonable under all the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 182 (August 26, 2010):

Here, the search was performed after the officers: recognized that Appellee might be subject to a bench warrant; witnessed him conceal something near his groin; faced a potentially dangerous, ongoing fracas; heard an individual scream “It’s in his crotch!”; knew that he sometimes carried a weapon; and became immediately aware that Appellee was harboring drugs on his person. We find that because of the need for officer and public safety and the need to preserve evidence, there existed ample justification to conduct this search.

. . .

Finally, we turn to the last Bell factor and consider the location in which the police conducted the search. Of all the factors considered thus far, we find this factor most troubling, yet ultimately conclude that it was reasonable under the circumstances. See Polk v. Montgomery Co., 782 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (4th Cir.1986) (whether the strip search was conducted in private is especially relevant in determining whether a strip search is reasonable under the circumstances). We recognize that strip searches are necessary for a plethora of reasons, and we understand that in order to preserve the safety of officers, of the public and of evidence, they must sometimes be employed. But we also take this opportunity, as did the United States Supreme Court, to issue a caveat: these interests “hardly justify disrobing an arrestee on the street.” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983). Indeed some courts have suppressed evidence where police officers, in an attempt to recover evidence, have exposed an arrestee's most private anatomy to the public. However, most of those cases involved searches conducted outside of four walls. [citations omitted] We do not have that here.

Here, while it is true that Appellee was strip searched in a room with a partially opened door it is also true that no one was in the line of sight during the search and that only the officers were in the room. And while the Court of Appeals was concerned with the possibility that someone might be able to peer into the room where the search was taking place, the evidence is to the contrary. We refuse to suppress evidence based upon the unsupported assertion that the search was conducted in a manner potentially exposing Appellate to prospective onlookers. Where a search is conducted unnecessarily exposing an arrestee's naked body to the public, we will suppress absent the most extraordinary and bizarre circumstances--but conjecture without evidence will not be considered.

Ultimately, because Appellee was strip searched within four walls and because he was not exposed to anyone not involved with the search, we conclude that the place in which the search was conducted was reasonable.