2004-05 TERM:
Decided:
Devenpeck
v Alford (2004, US) 160 L Ed
2d 537, 125 S Ct 588, Dec. 13 (§ 3.9): The Court's syllabus
follows:
"Believing that respondent was
impersonating a police officer, petitioner Haner, a Washington
State Patrol officer, pursued and pulled over respondent's vehicle.
While questioning respondent at the scene, petitioner Devenpeck,
Haner's supervisor, discovered that respondent was taping their
conversation and arrested him for violating the State's Privacy
Act. The state trial court subsequently dismissed the charge.
Respondent then filed this suit in federal court, claiming,
among other things, that his arrest violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court denied petitioners
qualified immunity, and the case went to trial. The jury was
instructed, inter alia, that respondent had to establish lack
of probable cause to arrest, and that taping police at a traffic
stop was not a crime in Washington. The jury found for petitioners.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, based in part on its conclusion
that petitioners could not have had probable cause to arrest.
It rejected petitioners' claim that there was probable cause
to arrest for impersonating and for obstructing a law enforcement
officer, because those offenses were not 'closely related' to
the offense invoked by Devenpeck at the time of arrest.
"Held: 1. A warrantless
arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
if, given the facts known to the officer, there is probable
cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed.
The Ninth Circuit's additional limitation–that the offense
establishing probable cause must be 'closely related' to, and
based on the same conduct as, the offense the arresting officer
identifies at the time of arrest–is inconsistent with
this Court's precedent, which holds that an arresting officer's
state of mind (except for facts that he knows) is irrelevant
to probable cause, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
812-815. The 'closely related offense' rule is also condemned
by its perverse consequences: it will not eliminate sham arrests
but will cause officers to cease providing reasons for arrest,
or to cite every class of offense for which probable cause could
conceivably exist.
"2. This Court will not decide
in the first instance whether petitioners lacked probable cause
to arrest respondent for either obstructing or impersonating
an officer because the Ninth Circuit, having found those offenses
legally irrelevant, did not decide that question."
Alford
v Haner (2003, CA9 Wash) 333 F3d 972
reversed.
Observation: This case
breaks no new ground. This is the approach of the Model Code
of Pre-Arraignment Procedure and is the law in many states that
an officer does not have to articulate the grounds for an arrest
as long as there is PC to believe that any offense
occurred. The question is, and always should be, "objective
reasonableness" that does not turn on the subjective intent
of the officer, and that is the Ninth Circuit's failing in the
holding below.
Should Saucier v Katz "constitutional question first, qualified immmunity second" rule be reexamined?
Also decided that date is Brosseu
v Haugen (2004, US) 2004 US
Lexis 8275, 125 S Ct 596 (per curiam). Lexis overview: "The
officer was attempting to arrest the victim, who had locked
himself in his vehicle. The victim ignored the officer's commands,
issued at gun point, to get out of the vehicle. The officer
shattered the driver's side window by hitting it with her handgun.
She unsuccessfully attempted to grab the keys and struck the
victim on the head with her gun. The victim, still undeterred,
succeeded in starting the vehicle and began to move away. The
officer fired one shot through a window of the vehicle, hitting
the victim in the back. She later explained that she shot him
because she was fearful for other officers she believed were
in the immediate area on foot, as well as for the occupied vehicles
in the victim's path and any other citizens who might have been
in the area. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court
was wrong on the issue of qualified immunity. Caselaw clearly
showed that this area was one in which the result depended very
much on the facts of each case. Furthermore the cases suggested
that the officer's actions fell in the hazy border between excessive
and acceptable force and did not clearly establish that the
officer's conduct had violated the Fourth Amendment."
Haugen
v Brosseau (2004, CA9 Wash) 339 F3d 857 reversed.
The concurring Justices (Bryer, Scalia,
and Ginsburg) said that they believed that the rule in Saucier
v Katz (2001) 533 US 194, 150 L Ed 2d 272, 121 S Ct 2151, should
be reassessed because the rule could lead to constitutional
questions being decided which become insulated from constitutional
review by the qualified immunity finding. Instead, they would
opt for deciding the easiest question first. Justice Stevens
dissented finding that there was a question for trial.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
2003-04 TERM:
Decided:
United
States v Banks (2003) 540 US 31, 157 L Ed
2d 343, 124 S Ct 521, decided Dec. 2, argued Oct. 15th (§§
44.3, 44.9, 44.10, 44.12, 44.27)
Maryland
v Pringle (2003) 540 US 366, 157 L
Ed 2d 769, 124 S Ct 795, decided Dec. 15, argued Nov. 3d (§§
3.8 n. 79.1-.7, 3.10 n. 95)
Illinois
v Lidster (2004) 540 US 419,
157 L Ed 2d 843, 124 S Ct 885, decided Jan. 13th, argued Nov.
5th (§§ 1.19 n. 289.1, 17.14 n. 161.1 & 17.15
n. 173)
Groh
v Ramirez (2004) 540 US 551,
157 L Ed 2d 1068, 124 S Ct 1284, decided Feb. 24th, argued Nov.
4th (§§ 5.7 n. 154.1-.3, 5.20 n. 300.1-.4, 19.4 n.
16, 43.11 n. 73.1 & 43.30 n. 188.1)
United
States v Flores-Montano (2004)
541 US 149, 158 L Ed 2d 311, 124 S Ct 1582, granted Oct. 14th,
argued Feb. 25th, decided March 30th. (§§ 26.4 & 26.14
n. 146)
Thornton
v United States (2004) 541
US 615, 158 L Ed 2d 905, 124 S Ct 2127, granted Nov. 3d, argued
Mar. 31st, decided May 24th. (§§ 16.5 nn. 127.1-.3,
16.10 nn. 186.1-.2, 18.9 nn. 228.1-.6, 18.12)
Hiibel
v Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humbolt County
(2004, US) 159 L Ed 2d 292, 124 S Ct 2451, granted Oct. 30th,
argued Mar. 22d, decided June 21st. (§§ 15.5 nn. 186.27-.34
& 15.20)
Rumsfeld
v Padilla (2004, US) 124 S Ct 2711, 159 L Ed 2d 513,
granted Feb. 20th, argued April 18th, decided June 28th (not
a Fourth Amendment case)
Hamdi
v Rumsfield (2004, US) 124 S Ct 2633, 159 L Ed 2d
578, granted Jan. 9th, agured April 20th, decided June 28th
(not a Fourth Amendment case)
Rasul
v Bush (2004, US) 124 S Ct 2686, 159 L Ed 2d 548,
granted Nov. 10th, argued April 28th, decided June 28th (not
a Fourth Amendment case)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Hiibel
v Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, Humboldt County
(2004, US) 159 L Ed 2d 292, 124 S Ct 2451, decided June
21st, holding that an officer has a right to ask a stopped motorist
his name without violating the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. From
the Syllabus:
"Petitioner Hiibel was arrested and
convicted in a Nevada court for refusing to identify himself
to a police officer during an investigative stop involving a
reported assault. Nevada’s 'stop and identify' statute requires
a person detained by an officer under suspicious circumstances
to identify himself. The state intermediate appellate court
affirmed, rejecting Hiibel’s argument that the state law’s application
to his case violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Nevada
Supreme Court affirmed.
"Held: Petitioner’s conviction
does not violate his Fourth Amendment rights or the Fifth Amendment’s
prohibition on self-incrimination. Pp. 3–13.
"(a) State stop and identify statutes
often combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions
intended to regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory
stops. They vary from State to State, but all permit an officer
to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity. In Papachristou
v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 167–171, this Court invalidated
a traditional vagrancy law for vagueness because of its broad
scope and imprecise terms. The Court recognized similar constitutional
limitations in Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52, where
it invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify
statute on Fourth Amendment grounds, and in Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, where it invalidated on vagueness
grounds California’s modified stop and identify statute that
required a suspect to give an officer 'credible and reliable'
identification when asked to identify himself, id.,
at 360. This case begins where those cases left off. Here, the
initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the
Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown. Further,
Hiibel has not alleged that the Nevada statute is unconstitutionally
vague, as in Kolender. This statute is narrower and
more precise. In contrast to the 'credible and reliable' identification
requirement in Kolender, the Nevada Supreme Court has
interpreted the instant statute to require only that a suspect
disclose his name. It apparently does not require him to produce
a driver’s license or any other document. If he chooses either
to state his name or communicate it to the officer by other
means, the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs. Pp.
3–6.
"(b) The officer’s conduct did
not violate Hiibel’s Fourth Amendment rights. Ordinarily, an
investigating officer is free to ask a person for identification
without implicating the Amendment. INS v. Delgado,
466 U. S. 210, 216. Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1, the Court has recognized that an officer’s reasonable
suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity
permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and
take additional steps to investigate further. Although it is
well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify
himself during a Terry stop, see, e.g., United States v.
Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 229, it has been an open question
whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal
to answer, see Brown, supra, at 53, n. 3. The Court
is now of the view that Terry principles permit a State
to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a
Terry stop. Terry, supra, at 34. The Nevada
statute is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against
unreasonable searches and seizures because it properly balances
the intrusion on the individual’s interests against the promotion
of legitimate government interests. See Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U. S. 648, 654. An identity request has an immediate relation
to the Terry stop’s purpose, rationale, and practical
demands, and the threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that
the request does not become a legal nullity. On the other hand,
the statute does not alter the nature of the stop itself, changing
neither its duration nor its location. Hiibel argues unpersuasively
that the statute circumvents the probable-cause requirement
by allowing an officer to arrest a person for being suspicious,
thereby creating an impermissible risk of arbitrary police conduct.
These familiar concerns underlay Kolender, Brown, and
Papachristou. They are met by the requirement that
a Terry stop be justified at its incep-tion and be
'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified'
the initial stop. Terry, 392 U. S., at 20. Under those
principles, an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure
to identify himself if the identification request is not reasonably
related to the circumstances justifying the stop. Cf. Hayes
v. Florida, 470 U. S. 811, 817. The request in this case
was a commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest
for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded
insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the State’s
requirement of a response did not contravene the Fourth Amendment.
Pp. 6–10.
"(c) Hiibel’s contention that his
conviction violates the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on self-incrimination
fails because disclosure of his name and identity presented
no reasonable danger of incrimination. The Fifth Amendment prohibits
only compelled testimony that is incriminating, see Brown
v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 598, and protects only against
disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used
in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that
might be so used, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.
S. 441, 445. Hiibel’s refusal to disclose was not based on any
articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be
used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish evidence needed
to prosecute him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.
S. 479, 486. It appears he refused to identify himself only
because he thought his name was none of the of-ficer’s business.
While the Court recognizes his strong belief that he should
not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does
not override the Nevada Legislature’s judgment to the contrary
absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to
incriminate him. Answering a request to disclose a name is likely
to be so insignificant as to be incriminating only in unusual
circumstances. See, e.g., Baltimore City Dept. of Social
Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U. S. 549, 555. If a case arises
where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity
at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in
the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a
separate offense, the court can then consider whether the Fifth
Amendment privilege applies, whether it has been violated, and
what remedy must follow. Those questions need not be resolved
here. 10–13." §§ 15.5 n. 186.27-.34 & 15.20.
United
States v Flores-Montano (2004)
541 US 149, 158 L Ed 2d 905, 124 S Ct 2127, holding that reasonable
suspicion is not required for a gas tank removal as a part of
a border search. Although the government had reasonable suspicion
in this case, it chose to disclaim reliance on reasonable suspicion
and go with the border search exception, and the Supreme Court
agreed that reasonable suspicion does not apply, holding that
the Ninth Circuit's requirement of reasonable suspicion for
more intrusive searches of persons could not be imported into
searches of vehicles at the border because of the differing
and lesser privacy interests involved in vehicles. As a practical
matter, I do not see this case having much effect on the law
of border searches. It serves one salutary interest of the government
and the judiciary: not having to litigate whether reasonable
suspicion was present. Rehnquist commented that a wait of 1-2
hours at the border is "to be expected." If one has
ever crossed at Tijuana or Niagara Falls (in either direction),
you know that's how long it can take without being detained.
The result was not unexpected. Besides, Terry holds
that any search can be argued to be unreasonable, even if it
was justified from its inception. That would apply here.
From the syllabus:
"At the international border in southern
California, customs officials seized 37 kilograms of marijuana
from respondent's gas tank by removing and disassembling the
tank. After respondent was indicted on federal drug charges,
he moved to suppress the drugs recovered from the gas tank,
relying on a Ninth Circuit panel decision holding that a gas
tank's removal requires reasonable suspicion under the Fourth
Amendment. The District Court granted the motion, and the Ninth
Circuit summarily affirmed.
"Held: The search did not require
reasonable suspicion. In the decision relied on below, the Ninth
Circuit panel seized on language from United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538, that used "routine" as
a descriptive term in discussing border searches. The panel
took "routine," fashioned a new balancing test, and extended
it to vehicle searches. But the reasons that might support a
suspicion requirement in the case of highly intrusive searches
of persons simply do not carry over to vehicles. Complex balancing
tests to determine what is a "routine" vehicle search, as opposed
to a more "intrusive" search of a person, have no place in border
searches of vehicles. The Government's interest in preventing
the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at
the international border. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606, 616. Congress has always granted the Executive plenary
authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border,
without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the
collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband
into this country. Montoya de Hernandez, supra, at
537. Respondent's assertion that he has a privacy interest in
his fuel tank, and that the suspicionless disassembly of his
tank is an invasion of his privacy, is rejected, as the privacy
expectation is less at the border than it is in the interior,
id., at 538, and this Court has long recognized that
automobiles seeking entry into this country may be searched,
see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154. And
while the Fourth Amendment "protects property as well as privacy,"
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 62, the interference
with a motorist's possessory interest in his gas tank is justified
by the Government's paramount interest in protecting the border.
Thus, the Government's authority to conduct suspicionless inspections
at the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble,
and reassemble a vehicle's fuel tank."
Groh
v Ramirez (2004, US)
157 L Ed 2d 1068, 124 S Ct 1284, holding that a search warrant
was defective and not saved by Leon or qualified immunity
where the warrant failed to specify the items sought even though
the affidavit did; the officer could not rely on the magistrate's
signing off on a clearly deficient warrant as providing any
refuge. (The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit on this
one: Ramirez v Butte-Silver Bow County (2002, CA9 Mont) 298
F3d 1022). §§ 43.11 n. 73.1 & 43.30 n. 188.1.
The syllabus follows:
"Petitioner, a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms agent, prepared and signed an application for a
warrant to search respondents’ Montana ranch, which stated that
the search was for specified weapons, explosives, and records.
The application was supported by petitioner’s detailed affidavit
setting forth his basis for believing that such items were on
the ranch and was accompanied by a warrant form that he completed.
The Magistrate Judge (Magistrate) signed the warrant form even
though it did not identify any of the items that petitioner
intended to seize. The portion calling for a description of
the 'person or property' described respondents’ house, not the
alleged weapons; the warrant did not incorporate by reference
the application’s itemized list. Petitioner led federal and
local law enforcement officers to the ranch the next day but
found no illegal weapons or explosives. Petitioner left a copy
of the warrant, but not the application, with respondents. Respondents
sued petitioner and others under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming,
inter alia, a Fourth Amendment violation. The District Court
granted the defendants summary judgment, finding no Fourth Amendment
violation, and finding that even if such a violation occurred,
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed except as to the Fourth Amendment claim against
petitioner, holding that the warrant was invalid because it
did not describe with particularity the place to be searched
and the items to be seized. The court also concluded that United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, precluded qualified immunity for
petitioner because he was the leader of a search who did not
read the warrant and satisfy himself that he understood its
scope and limitations and that it was not obviously defective.
"Held: 1. The search was clearly
'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 5–11.
"(a) The warrant was plainly invalid.
It did not meet the Fourth Amendment’s unambiguous requirement
that a warrant 'particularly describ[e] ... the persons or things
to be seized.” The fact that the application adequately described
those things does not save the warrant; Fourth Amendment interests
are not necessarily vindicated when another document says something
about the objects of the search, but that document’s contents
are neither known to the person whose home is being searched
nor available for her inspection. It is not necessary to decide
whether the Amendment permits a warrant to cross-reference other
documents, because such incorporation did not occur here. Pp.
5–6.
"(b) Petitioner’s argument that the
search was nonetheless reasonable is rejected. Because the warrant
did not describe the items at all, it was so obviously deficient
that the search must be regarded as warrantless, and thus presumptively
unreasonable. This presumptive rule applies to searches whose
only defect is a lack of particularity in the warrant. Petitioner
errs in arguing that such searches should be exempt from the
presumption if they otherwise satisfy the particularity requirement’s
goals. Unless items in the af-fidavit are set forth in the warrant,
there is no written assurance that the Magistrate actually found
probable cause for a search as broad as the affiant requested.
The restraint petitioner showed in conducting the instant search
was imposed by the agent himself, not a judicial officer. Moreover,
the particularity requirement’s purpose is not limited to preventing
general searches; it also assures the individual whose property
is searched and seized of the executing officer’s legal authority,
his need to search, and the limits of his power to do so. This
case presents no occasion to reach petitioner’s argument that
the particularity requirements’ goals were served when he orally
described the items to respondents, because respondents dispute
his account. Pp. 6–11. 2. Petitioner is not entitled to qualified
immunity despite the constitutional violation because 'it would
be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful
in the situation he confronted,' Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
202. Given that the particularity requirement is stated in the
Constitution’s text, no reasonable officer could believe that
a warrant that did not comply with that requirement was valid.
Moreover, because petitioner prepared the warrant, he may not
argue that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate’s assurance
that it contained an adequate description and was valid. Nor
could a reasonable officer claim to be unaware of the basic
rule that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search
of a home is presumptively unconstitutional. '[A] warrant may
be so facially deficient ... that the executing officers can-not
reasonably presume it to be valid.' Leon, 468 U.S.,
at 923. This is such a case. Pp. 11–14.
Illinois
v. Lidster (2004,
US) 157 L Ed 2d 843, 124 S Ct 885, decided Jan. 13th, holding
that an informational gathering, not general crime control,
roadblock was constitutional. Lidster was found DWI when he
came to the roadblock.
From the Court's Syllabus:
"Police set up a highway checkpoint
to obtain information from motorists about a hit-and-run accident
occurring about one week earlier at the same location and time
of night. Officers stopped each vehicle for 10 to 15 seconds,
asked the occupants whether they had seen anything happen there
the previous weekend, and handed each driver a flyer describing
and requesting information about the accident. As respondent
Lidster approached, his minivan swerved, nearly hitting an officer.
The officer smelled alcohol on Lidster's breath. Another officer
administered a sobriety test and then arrested Lidster. He was
convicted in Illinois state court of driving under the influence
of alcohol. He challenged his arrest and conviction on the ground
that the government obtained evidence through use of a checkpoint
stop that violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court rejected
that challenge, but the state appellate court reversed. The
State Supreme Court agreed, holding that, in light of Indianapolis
v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, the stop was unconstitutional.
"Held: The checkpoint stop did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
"(a) Edmond does not govern
the outcome of this case. In Edmond, this Court held
that, absent special circumstances, the Fourth Amendment forbids
police to make stops without individualized suspicion at a checkpoint
set up primarily for general 'crime control' purposes. 531 U.S.,
at 41, 44. Specifically, the checkpoint in Edmond was
designed to ferret out drug crimes committed by the motorists
themselves. Here, the stop's primary law enforcement purpose
was not to determine whether a vehicle's occupants were committing
a crime, but to ask the occupants, as members of the public,
for help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood
committed by others. Edmond's language, as well as
its context, makes clear that an information-seeking stop's
constitutionality was not then before this Court.
"(b) Nor does the Fourth Amendment require
courts to apply an Edmond-type rule of automatic unconstitutionality
to such stops. The fact that they normally lack individualized
suspicion cannot by itself determine the constitutional outcome,
as the Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist's car as his
castle, see, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-113,
and special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify
highway stops without individualized suspicion, see, e.g., Michigan
Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444. Moreover, the context
here (seeking information from the public) is one in which,
by definition, the concept of individualized suspicion has little
role to play, and an information-seeking stop is not the kind
of event that involves suspicion, or lack thereof, of the relevant
individual. In addition, information-seeking highway stops are
less likely to provoke anxiety or to prove intrusive, since
they are likely brief, the questions asked are not designed
to elicit self-incriminating information, and citizens will
often react positively when police ask for help. The law also
ordinarily permits police to seek the public's voluntary cooperation
in a criminal investigation. That the importance of soliciting
the public's assistance is offset to some degree by the need
to stop a motorist–which amounts to a 'seizure' in Fourth
Amendment terms, e.g., Edmond, supra, at 40–is
not important enough to justify an Edmond-type rule here. Finally,
such a rule is not needed to prevent an unreasonable proliferation
of police checkpoints. Practical considerations of limited police
resources and community hostility to traffic tie-ups seem likely
to inhibit any such proliferation, and the Fourth Amendment's
normal insistence that the stop be reasonable in context will
still provide an important legal limitation on checkpoint use.
"(c) The checkpoint stop was constitutional.
In judging its reasonableness, hence, its constitutionality,
this Court looks to 'the gravity of the public concerns served
by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the
public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual
liberty.' Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51. The relevant public
concern was grave, as the police were investigating a crime
that had resulted in a human death, and the stop advanced this
concern to a significant degree given its timing and location.
Most importantly, the stops interfered only minimally with liberty
of the sort the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect. Viewed objectively,
each stop required only a brief wait in line and contact with
police for only a few seconds. Viewed subjectively, the systematic
contact provided little reason for anxiety or alarm, and there
is no allegation that the police acted in a discriminatory or
otherwise unlawful manner."
I watched the oral argument, and one
could see this coming.
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg concurred
in part and dissented in part, concluding that the case should
have been remanded for a reasonableness determination.
See the NY Times article, Court
Upholds Police Use of Roadblocks to Seek Witnesses.
The Washington Post headline is misleading: High
Court Rules Roadblocks Don't Violate Privacy.
All roadblocks are constitutional? Hardly, roadblocks to locate
witnesses to a vehicular homicide are involved, and that's a
big difference. (Comment: Headline writers
aren't lawyers, and half the time don't carefully read the articles.
The problem is that police officers sometimes base their actions
on newspaper headlines as accurately reflecting the story.)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Maryland
v Pringle (2004, US) 157 L Ed 2d 769, 124
S Ct 795, December 15 (§ 3.8 n. 79.1-.7): finding cocaine
in a car was probable cause to believe that those associated
with it were jointly in possession of it; therefore, the arrest
of Pringle, a front seat passenger, for joint possession of
cocaine hidden behind a back seat armrest was not a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
From the syllabus: "A police officer
stopped a car for speeding at 3:16 a.m.; searched the car, seizing
$763 from the glove compartment and cocaine from behind the
back-seat armrest; and arrested the car's three occupants after
they denied ownership of the drugs and money. Respondent Pringle,
the front-seat passenger, was convicted of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine, and was sentenced
to 10 years' incarceration without the possibility of parole.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but the State
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, absent specific facts
tending to show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or control
over the drugs, the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest
when Pringle was a front-seat passenger in a car being driven
by its owner was insufficient to establish probable cause for
an arrest for possession.
"Held: Because the officer had probable
cause to arrest Pringle, the arrest did not contravene the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Maryland law authorizes police officers
to execute warrantless arrests, inter alia, where the officer
has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed
or is being committed in the officer's presence. Here, it is
uncontested that the officer, upon recovering the suspected
cocaine, had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed;
the question is whether he had probable cause to believe Pringle
committed that crime. The 'substance of all the definitions
of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,'
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175, and that belief
must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched
or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 91. To determine
whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest, a court
must examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide
'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint
of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to' probable
cause. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 696. As it is
an entirely reasonable inference from the facts here that any
or all of the car's occupants had knowledge of, and exercised
dominion and control over, the cocaine, a reasonable officer
could conclude that there was probable cause to believe Pringle
committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely
or jointly. Pringle's attempt to characterize this as a guilt-by-association
case is unavailing. Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, and United States
v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581, distinguished."
United
States v Banks (2003)
540 US 31, 157 LEd 2d 343, 124 S Ct 521, December 2d (§§
44.3, 44.9, 44.10, 44.12, 44.27): The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
Banks holding that a 20 second delay before a forcible
entry after announcement was not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment or 18 U.S.C. § 3109. The Syllabus follows:
"When federal and local law enforcement
officers went to respondent Banks's apartment to execute a warrant
to search for cocaine, they called out 'police search warrant'
and rapped on the front door hard enough to be heard by officers
at the back door, waited for 15 to 20 seconds with no response,
and then broke open the door. Banks was in the shower and testified
that he heard nothing until the crash of the door. The District
Court denied his motion to suppress the drugs and weapons found
during the search, rejecting his argument that the officers
waited an unreasonably short time before forcing entry in violation
of both the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109. Banks pleaded
guilty, but reserved his right to challenge the search on appeal.
In reversing and ordering the evidence suppressed, the Ninth
Circuit found, using a four- part scheme for vetting knock-and-announce
entries, that the instant entry had no exigent circumstances,
making forced entry by destruction of property permissible only
if there was an explicit refusal of admittance or a time lapse
greater than the one here.
"Held: "1.
The officers' 15-to-20-second wait before forcible entry satisfied
the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 4-11.
"(a) The standards bearing on whether
officers can legitimately enter after knocking are the same
as those for requiring or dispensing with knock and announce
altogether. This Court has fleshed out the notion of reasonable
execution on a case-by-case basis, but has pointed out factual
considerations of unusual, albeit not dispositive, significance.
The obligation to knock and announce before entering gives way
when officers have reasonable grounds to expect futility or
to suspect that an exigency, such as evidence destruction, will
arise instantly upon knocking. Richards v. Wisconsin,
520 U.S. 385, 394. Since most people keep their doors locked,
a no-knock entry will normally do some damage, a fact too common
to require a heightened justification when a reasonable suspicion
of exigency already justifies an unwarned entry. United
States v. Ramirez, 523 U. S. 65, 70-71. Pp. 4-6.
"(b) This case turns on the exigency
revealed by the circumstances known to the officers after they
knocked and announced, which the Government contends was the
risk of losing easily disposable evidence. After 15 to 20 seconds
without a response, officers could fairly have suspected that
Banks would flush away the cocaine if they remained reticent.
Each of Banks's counterarguments–that he was in the shower
and did not hear the officers, and that it might have taken
him longer than 20 seconds to reach the door–rests on
a mistake about the relevant enquiry. As to the first argument,
the facts known to the police are what count in judging a reasonable
waiting time, and there is no indication that they knew that
Banks was in the shower and thus unaware of an impending search.
As to the second, the crucial fact is not the time it would
take Banks to reach the door but the time it would take him
to destroy the cocaine. It is not unreasonable to think that
someone could get in a position to destroy the drugs within
15 to 20 seconds. Once the exigency had matured, the officers
were not bound to learn anything more or wait any longer before
entering, even though the entry entailed some harm to the building.
Pp. 6-9.
"(c) This Court's emphasis on totality
analysis leads it to reject the Government's position that the
need to damage property should not be part of the analysis of
whether the entry itself was reasonable and to disapprove of
the Ninth Circuit's four-part vetting scheme. Pp. 10-11.
"2. The entry here also satisfied 18
U.S.C. § 3109, which permits entry by force 'if, after notice
of his authority and purpose, [an officer] is refused admittance.'
Because § 3109 implicates the exceptions to the common law knock-and-announce
requirement that inform the Fourth Amendment itself, § 3109
is also subject to an exigent circumstances exception, which
qualifies the requirement of refusal after notice, just as it
qualifies the obligation to announce in the first place. Pp.
11-12."
2002-03 TERM:
Confession obtained by arrest without probable cause
must be suppressed if state cannot show no taint from arrest.
The Supreme Court held May 5, 2003 in
a per curiam opinion in Kaupp
v. Texas (2003) 538 US 626,
155 L Ed 2d 814, 123 S Ct 1843, that a confession "obtained
by exploitation of an illegal arrest must not be used against
a criminal defendant." The case involved a 17 year old arrested
at 3 a.m. from his bedroom in his underwear in January without
probable cause or a warrant (with entry permitted by his father).
Because Kaupp was taken into custody before questioning, the
state bore the burden of showing that the confession was not
tainted by the illegal arrest. The Court vacated and remanded
for reconsideration. See §§ 7.13, 8.9 n. 179.1, 22.3
n. 45 & 22.15 n. 104.
The Texas Court of Appeals in Kaupp
v State (2001, Tex App–Houston (14th Dist) 2001 Tex App
Lexis 3732, *5 (unpublished) held that Kaupp had not been arrested
before he confessed. Kaupp was led away in handcuffs and questioned
about a murder.
