M.D.Pa.: Def was neither shipper nor recipient of USPS parcel, so he had no standing in it

Defendant was neither the shipper nor recipient of a USPS parcel with drugs in it, opened six weeks after it was unclaimed. He had no standing in it. United States v. Bell, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78182 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2024).

Defendant totaled his car in a wreck. “In this case, Defendant s arrest for DWI coupled with the crashed SUV either: (1) required NMSP officers to conduct a pre-tow inventory, or (2) allowed NMSP officers to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle for evidence relevant to the crime of arrest. … Either way, Defendant s argument for suppression fails.” United States v. Vallez, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78985 (D.N.M. Apr. 30, 2024).*

Defendant was wanted and was seen at a car wash with his car. Police confronted him and arrested him. His car was searched, and his backpack was searched after he was placed in a patrol car, and he was a felon in possession. The government conceded the search incident doctrine did not apply, but inventory and inevitable discovery did, which is what the court found. The fact the officer believed a search incident was permissible didn’t mean that he wasn’t acting in good faith. In addition, the government’s effort to justify it as a search incident was out of time [but doesn’t ultimately matter]. United States v. Harper, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78716 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 30, 2024).*

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WI: Obtaining def’s DNA by ruse wasn’t an illegal search

The state got defendant to lick an envelope and hand it over as part of a ruse. His DNA matched to a cold case. That was not an unreasonable search. State v. Vannieuwenhoven, 2024 Wisc. App. LEXIS 349 (Apr. 30, 2024).

“In Claim 8, Movant asserts that counsel performed ineffectively for failing to file a motion to suppress …. Movant claims that he ‘informed Counsel to file a motion to suppress and Counsel refused to do so’ …. Movant does not explain what counsel should have sought to suppress, or the grounds on which such a motion should have been brought.” Ramos v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77697 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2024).*

“Mr. Price’s focus on a few paragraphs in the August Affidavit and the June Affidavit, which span six pages and 35 pages, respectively, is too narrow of a reading. When the Affidavits are reviewed in their entirety (separately), the circumstances presented in them would lead a reasonable person to believe there was a fair probability that drugs and evidence of sex trafficking would be found at 139 South Princeton in August 2021 and June 2022.” United States v. Price, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78603 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2024).*

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WaPo: Apple, Google and Venmo fight new U.S. plan to monitor payment apps

WaPo: Apple, Google and Venmo fight new U.S. plan to monitor payment apps by Tony Romm (“The U.S. government is weighing whether to treat Apple, Google and PayPal-owned Venmo more like banks — and regularly inspect some of their operations — in a move meant to protect millions of Americans who now use their smartphones to pay at the register and send money to family and friends. But the prospect of heightened federal oversight has sparked deep and wide-ranging unease throughout the tech industry, triggering a lobbying offensive that aims to limit the government’s power to monitor mobile wallets, accounts or other digital payment services.”)

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CA4: Tracking order using cell site simulator with PC was reasonable

The use of a cell site simulator to track defendant’s phone was conducted by a tracking order issued under state law with probable cause. Tracking him led the police to his place, and then a search warrant issued for the place. United States v. Briscoe, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10428 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 2024).

There was no showing of probable cause to arrest or that the law wasn’t clearly established. “We affirm. The officers are not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated Ms. Cronick’s clearly established constitutional rights.” Cronick v. Pryor, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10381 (10th Cir. Apr. 30, 2024).*

Defendant contends the affidavit for warrant was misleading by omissions. “But Mr. Hawkins makes no preliminary showing that Detective Goble’s statements were misleading.” United States v. Hawkins, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77597 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2024).*

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CADC: When searching a cell phone and officers find it belonged to someone else, a new SW isn’t required; SWs are directed at things, places, and people and owner doesn’t matter for PC

Officers seized a cell phone from Thorne, a suspected narcotics and firearms trafficker. In a search under a warrant, the officers found out the phone actually belonged to defendant. Warrants are directed at things, and that didn’t require them to stop and get another warrant showing that. United States v. Hutchings, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10369 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, 2024).

Defendant’s stop followed the officer seeing a badly cracked windshield and then running the LPN which revealed unpaid tolls. The stop was valid. United States v. Partridge, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77120 (D. Me. Apr. 29, 2024).*

The parties stipulated to the facts of the stop, and that included that there was reasonable suspicion to believe that it was based on a hand-to-hand drug transaction. The trial court left that out of the written order, but it was stipulated to. State v. O’Day, 2024-Ohio-1654 (3d Dist. Apr. 29, 2024).*

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Seattle Times: US drug control agency will move to reclassify marijuana in a historic shift, AP sources

Seattle Times: US drug control agency will move to reclassify marijuana in a historic shift, AP sources say by Lindsay Whitehurst, Joshua Goodman, Zeke Miller and Jim Mustian.

NYT: Justice Dept. Plans to Recommend Easing Restrictions on Marijuana (“The move would kick off a lengthy rule-making process and would amount to a major change in federal policy.”)

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D.N.M.: Even if def’s DNA was not obtained by consent, inevitable discovery applies

Even if defendant’s DNA was obtained by coercion, inevitable discovery applies. United States v. Montoya, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77952 (D.N.M. Apr. 29, 2024).*

A description of video of a shooting incident that identifies defendant, on independent review, was not knowingly or recklessly false. United States v. McCullough, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77337 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2024).*

Petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his jail calls, so that can’t form the basis of habeas relief. Casey v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77148 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2024).*

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E.D.Mo.: PV warrant permitted entry to place where def reasonably suspected to reside

PV warrant permitted entry into suspected residence of violator. “However, the Eighth Circuit has made clear that, provided an administrative warrant is supported by reasonable cause, it carries the same implied limited authority to enter a dwelling to effectuate an arrest as judicial warrants based upon probable cause. … As such, the parole violator’s warrant for Thorp allowed officers to enter Baker’s home, or the curtilage of Baker’s home if they had both (1) a reasonable belief that Thorp resided at Baker’s home and (2) reason to believe Thorp was present at the time the warrant was being executed. … Reasonable belief is ‘a less exacting standard than probable cause.’” United States v. Thorp, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77475 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2024).

The search warrant for defendant’s iCloud account was particularized as to a specific time period and four possible federal crimes. “These limitations were sufficient to ensure that the executing officers would not undertake ‘a general, exploratory rummaging’ through the contents of Byrd’s accounts. Fallon, 61 F.4th at 107. And the facts attested to in the probable cause affidavit supported the finding of probable cause for a search of this scope.” United States v. Byrd, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76693 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2024).*

The officer developed reasonable suspicion which justified extending the stop here. United States v. Trusty, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76793 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2024).*

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Topeka Capital-Journal: Kansas sets higher bar for police seizure after accusations of for-profit policing

Topeka Capital-Journal: Kansas sets higher bar for police seizure after accusations of for-profit policing by Jack Harvel (“Kansas reformed civil asset forfeiture — the law enforcement tactic of seizing property suspected of being used in a crime — to be more limited in scope and requiring higher standards of evidence.”)

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E.D.Wis.: SW for cell phones allowed seizure of others found on premises

In this cell phone search warrant case, the government could seize multiple cell phones found at defendant’s house, old phones and others not named when they were found. Old phones and other phones could also have evidence on them. United States v. Robinson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77296 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 29, 2024).

Defendant’s cracked windshield justified his stop. “The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has been clear: when an officer observes even a minor traffic violation, there is probable cause to stop the vehicle, even if the traffic stop is a pretext for another investigation. … The fact that Officer Johnson was looking for a reason to stop the Impala is irrelevant.” United States v. Witt, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76876 (D.S.D. Mar. 8, 2024),* adopted, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76875 (D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2024).*

Defendant’s illegal search claim isn’t supported by plain error. State v. Fulcher, 2024-Ohio-1609 (2d Dist. Apr. 26, 2024).*

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CA6: No QI for shooting a man obviously surrendering

Officers responded to an armed potentially suicidal man they found in his house. When commanded to show his hands he started to get down to the floor when he was shot. “A jury could find these actions would indicate to a reasonable officer that Mr. Heeter was not threatening to the officers in the room; indeed, they could indicate that Mr. Heeter was beginning to comply with officer instructions. One of the officers reacted to Mr. Heeter’s movements by starting to talk to him; his words got cut off by the five shots from Officer Bowers’s rifle. And none of the other officers fired their weapons. Since a jury could find a reasonable officer would not have perceived Mr. Heeter to pose a deadly threat, Officer Bowers is not entitled to summary judgment on the excessive force claim.” Heeter v. Bowers, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10299 (6th Cir. Apr. 29, 2024).*

This defendant officer acted reasonably in relying on information passed on by another officer that led to plaintiff’s stop. Other defendants get qualified immunity for some claims or not at all. Sims v. Brown, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10281 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2024).*

“Accordingly, accepting the facts as the district court has given them to us, Sheriff Frye and Deputy Buchanan lacked probable cause to arrest Thurston for any of the crimes alleged in the warrant. For ‘notwithstanding the deference that magistrates deserve,’ Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, the officers’ knowledge of Thurston’s pure motives precludes finding that probable cause existed.” The officers failed to show that lack of clearly established law provides qualified immunity. Thurston v. Frye, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10292 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2024).*

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DE: Officers approaching men on a stoop at night with a police dog saying “nobody move” was a seizure

Officers approaching men on a stoop at 10 pm with a police dog and saying “nobody move” was a seizure. Here it was with reasonable suspicion based on a CI’s information that was detailed, reliable, and significantly corroborated. State v. Fullman, 2024 Del. Super. LEXIS 353 (Apr. 24, 2024).

Defendant is a LEO indicted for using unreasonable force against an arrestee. The indictment sufficiently alleges he was trained on the use of force. United States v. Dupree, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76227 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2024).*

Despite suppression of evidence in state court, there was probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest. “Defendants have thus produced evidence that Humphreys had probable cause to believe Plaintiff committed this crime at the felony level. The fact that the evidence seized was later suppressed in Plaintiff’s criminal proceeding does not change this analysis. This is because the exclusionary rule does not apply in proceedings brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Saula v. City of Newport, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76405 (D. Or. Apr. 26, 2024).*

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E.D.N.Y.: To get CSLI, there must be some showing the phone was involved in the crime

Just saying that criminals usually have their cell phones on them is not sufficient for probable cause. Something tying the phone to the crime, however, is enough. Here it was text messages.
United States v. Rutledge, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76534 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2024).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies whether the party was the state court defendant or plaintiff. Bowen v. Gordon, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76171 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2024).*

Qualified immunity applies: “Viewing the facts in plaintiff’s favor, defendant officers reasonably believed that plaintiff’s arrest for obstructing official business was lawful.” One Eye El-Bey v. Wallace, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76508 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2024).*

The court grants defendant’s motion to suppress, and it’s up to the Government to persuade the Eleventh Circuit the community caretaking function should apply. United States v. Lewis, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76519 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2024).*

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W.D.Ky.: Illegal stop that was suppressed not excluded in § 1983 case

“Although the marijuana in Codrington’s car was discovered through an unreasonable search, that is immaterial to the Court’s analysis because the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not apply to § 1983 proceedings. As long as the marijuana found in Codrington’s car was not fabricated by the officers, they would have had ‘probable cause for his arrest, notwithstanding the previous unlawful stop … [and] the existence of probable cause for the arrest would also bar recovery on a theory of malicious prosecution.’ Martin v. Marinez, 934 F.3d 594, 598-99 (7th Cir. 2019).” Codrington v. Dolak, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76433 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 26, 2024).*

There was at least some indicia of probable cause in the affidavit for search warrant, so the warrant was executed in good faith. United States v. Vo Tran, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10068 (11th Cir. Apr. 25, 2024).*

2254 petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for defense counsel’s not raising a challenge to his consent was rejected on the merits. It’s not an unreasonable application of SCOTUS precedent. Harvey v. King, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10179 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2024).*

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CO adopts Graham for state excessive force claims

Colorado adopts the Graham v. Connor standard for excessive force under state law. Plaintiff stated enough to overcome a motion to dismiss. Woodall v. Godfrey, 2024 COA 42 (Apr. 25, 2024).*

“Scafidi’s ‘seizure’ was not unreasonable, because his arrest was based on probable cause as a matter of law. At the time of the arrest, the responding officer had found Carter locked and bleeding in Scafidi’s hotel bathroom, and knew that Carter had called 911 and reported that Scafidi was trying to harm her. Based on these undisputed facts, a reasonable detective could conclude that a ‘fair probability’ existed that a sexual assault occurred, which is sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest.” Scafidi v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10056 (9th Cir. Apr. 25, 2024).*

Plaintiff fails to show that his recorded jail calls to his lawyer, made on the general outgoing call phone, were given to the prosecutors and compromised his Sixth Amendment rights. Summary judgment for defendants. Hurdsman v. Viapath Techs., Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75442 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 3, 2024),* adopted, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73657 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 23, 2024).*

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D.Me.: Alleged statutory violation doesn’t warrant exclusionary rule

In a search of medical records, records were seized in excess of the scope of a prior Patient Records Order for information other than patient drug abuse, but that did not warrant suppression here because the Fourth Amendment was not violated. A statutory violation alone doesn’t warrant suppression. United States v. Norris, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76033 (D. Me. Apr. 26, 2024).*

“However, the Appellants attempt to frame the rights they assert as ‘straight forward and well established: the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, the right to bodily integrity, the right to privacy, and the right to equal protection under the laws.’ … The Appellants’ framing is the type of ‘broad general proposition’ that does not pass muster under the qualified immunity inquiry and is too abstract to provide guidance to reasonable state officials. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.” Wright-Gottshall v. New Jersey, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10158 (3d Cir. Apr. 26, 2024).*

Defendant established a prima facie case of a Franks violation that significant information was omitted. It, however, was not material to the probable cause finding. United States v. Norris, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76032 (D. Me. Apr. 26, 2024).*

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WaPo: Dating apps selling users’ sexual preferences

WaPo: Dating apps are collecting more of your information than you think by Chris Velasco (“Research from the Mozilla Foundation says these apps are getting ‘thirstier’ for our data”)

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CA7: No standing in a stolen car; PC anyway for automobile exception

Defendant was driving a stolen car. He had no standing in it. Besides, the search was good under the automobile exception with probable cause. United States v. Ostrum, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 10076 (7th Cir. Apr. 25, 2024).

The Labor Secretary’s subpoena duces tecum for information was reasonable and within the authority of the department. Su v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74901 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 24, 2024).*

“Gist has previously been convicted of drug distribution crimes …; he had been known to use his home address in carrying out those crimes …; he owned the address in question …; and he had been observed traveling from another address – his business – where evidence of drug activity had been found to his home address in a vehicle also linked to drug activity …. Additionally, ‘“an affidavit containing credible, verified allegations of drug trafficking, verification that said defendant lives at a particular address, combined with the affiant officer’s experience that drug dealers keep evidence of dealing at their residence,” can be sufficient to demonstrate a nexus between the criminal activity and the suspect residence to validate the warrant — even “when there is absolutely no indication of any wrongdoing occurring at that residence”’.” United States v. Gist, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75121 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2024).*

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D.Minn.: Ion scan of apartment doorknob and lock did not violate curtilage

State officers conducted an ion scan of defendant’s apartment doorknob and lock which was legal under state law. This violated no reasonable expectation of privacy because the doorknob in an apartment hallway is not part of the curtilage. United States v. Jones, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75284 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2024):

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ND: Warrantless entry into garage to investigate driving on a suspended license unreasonable

Officers had probable cause to believe defendant was driving on a suspended DL, and they were parked outside his house and watched him drive into his garage. There was no exigency for the police entry into his garage to arrest him on that misdemeanor offense. “The facts presented to the district court do not establish exigent circumstances relating to dissipation or destruction of evidence. Moreover, the record is void of any evidence Fuglesten presented an imminent harm of violence or escape from the home. Fuglesten’s interaction with the officers was non-threatening. The record does not show that law enforcement lacked time to secure a warrant.” State v. Fuglesten, 2024 ND 74, 2024 N.D. LEXIS 69 (Apr. 19, 2024).

Defendant was a suspect in the theft of over 50 firearms, most of which had not been recovered. “For these reasons, the Court is satisfied that the protective detention of Defendant Johnston and Studeman was justified under the totality of the circumstances and was no longer than necessary to protect the officers from harm and complete Defendant Hutchins’ arrest.” It was custodian. Some questions fall within the public safety exception and aren’t suppressed, some don’t and are. United States v. Hutchins, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73550 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 23, 2024).*

Defendant’s 2255 repackaged the Fourth Amendment arguments he lost on appeal. Dismissed. James v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74972 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 2, 2024).*

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