Defendant’s backpack is not as much a personal repository as a wallet or purse. When officers ordered the occupants out of the car, the backpack was at defendant’s feet, and he was ordered to leave it behind. The inventory was valid. Officer safety was also a valid concern–the backpack could have contained a weapon. People v. Wallace, 2026 IL App (4th) 250795, 2026 Ill. App. LEXIS 193 (June 5, 2026).
Defense counsel can’t be ineffective for not filing a frivolous Franks motion. United States v. Jenkins, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125318 (N.D. Ind. June 5, 2026).*
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment civil claim was over seven years being filed, thus four years past limitations. McBee v. Battle, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125706 (W.D. Ark. June 8, 2026).*
Uncounseled at the hospital, defendant gave up the passcode to his cell phone to police. Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging that. Houbbadi v. State, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 344 (June 5, 2026).*
Posted inFranks doctrine, Ineffective assistance, Inventory, Reasonableness|Comments Off on IL: A backpack is not as personal a repository of stuff as a purse or wallet; officers ordered it left in vehicle for safety reasons and it was inventoried
The warrant for defendant’s cell phone was not for “any and all data,” and it was limited to a specific time frame, July 20, 2020 to November 30, 2021. Officers found a video of defendant having sex with a minor. The warrant was reasonable. Clark v. State, 2026 Del. LEXIS 216 (June 8, 2026).
There was probable cause for length of time for the CSLI for a string of Hobbs Act robberies. In any event, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Harris, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124807 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2026).*
Pro se plaintiff’s combined Title VII and § 1983 claim fail to state a claim. Merely because defendant was a former police officer, his actions aren’t state action. Gonzalez v. Asurion Ins. Servs., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78913 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2026),* adopted 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123421 (W.D. Tex. June 4, 2026).*
Bruen changed the law, and possession of a firearm outside the home is no longer reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop. Also, a Terry stop is a patdown of clothing, not looking into a bag being carried. Hicks v. State, 2026 Md. App. LEXIS 654 (June 4, 2026). Syllabus by the court:
Posted inReasonable suspicion, Scope of search|Comments Off on MD: Under Bruen, mere possession of a handgun outside the home is no longer RS; Terry stop doesn’t include looking in a bag
Officers came to defendant’s house with an arrest warrant. When they entered they asked him about any weapons in the house before a protective sweep. He directed them to a gun in the bedroom. That was all reasonable and inevitable discovery applies. State v. Linley, 2026 Mo. App. LEXIS 450 (June 5, 2026).* Update: Similar is United States v. Sayles, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125722 (D. Me. June 8, 2026).*
There must be standing to challenge a takings claim, and it’s like Fourth Amendment standing. Poppleton v. La Cite Dev., LLC, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 12843 (4th Cir. May 4, 2026).*
The CI’s information was reasonable suspicion for this stop. United States v. Morgan, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123860 (S.D. W.Va. June 4, 2026).*
Police did a protective sweep of defendant’s motel room finding shards of meth, but they remained there for six minutes per the body cam. That did not make the sweep unreasonable. United States v. Matarese, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122788 (M.D. Pa. June 3, 2026).*
Posted inInformant hearsay, Protective sweep, Standing|Comments Off on MO: When officers came with an arrest warrant, def’s admission he had a firearm justified the entry
An officer responded to an overdose call to back up EMS. While in defendant’s house, he shined his flashlight through a manufacturer’s hole in a shoebox to look inside. This was an unreasonable search because defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the shoebox. Commonwealth v. Herlth, 2026 PA Super 114, 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 284 (June 5, 2026) with a dissent:
“This is a tragic case of mistaken identity. A police officer believed he was targeting a gunman who had been firing on police from a residence. Instead, he shot and badly wounded a man who had disarmed the actual shooter and then emerged from the residence holding the weapon. The issue here is whether that officer’s mistake led to a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights. As lamentable as these events certainly were, we agree with the district court that no constitutional violation occurred on the specific facts of this case. The district court denied relief. We AFFIRM.” Martinez v. Hinojosa, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 16228 (5th Cir. June 4, 2026).
“Here, the facts within the four corners of the Affidavit established a nexus between Unit 1 and drug trafficking. … Second, even if Defendant Barnes’s actions alone were not sufficient to establish a nexus, the remainder of the facts in the Affidavit fill any gap.” United States v. Barnes, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122663 (E.D. Tenn. June 3, 2026).*
This forfeiture action is reversed, and the claimant’s unresolved motion to suppress should be considered on remand. United States v. $1,106,775.00 in U.S. Currency, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 16105 (9th Cir. June 2, 2026).*
Posted inExcessive force, Forfeiture, Nexus, Reasonableness|Comments Off on CA5: Accidentally shooting the man who disarmed the shooter from a residence was not a constitutional violation
Arrest on false evidence in a malicious prosecution case was based on a due process violation that undermined probable cause to arrest: Ciria v. Gerrans, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 16318 (9th Cir. June 5, 2026):
After controlled buys from defendant’s house, two separate police departments prepared search warrants for his place, and they were presented together. One was signed. Defendant moved to suppress contending there was no probable cause and it was so lacking that the good faith exception did not apply. The local police practice here was to minimize information about the CI to protect his identity from the accused including a clear reference to time. The USMJ recommended granting the motion because probable cause was lacking and it was bare bones, so no good faith exception. Granting that there was no probable cause, it was not bare bones. There was something here, and it at least supported the good faith exception. United States v. Barbour, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 16376 (6th Cir. June 4, 2026):
Here, the officer in a traffic stop wanted to run defendant’s LPN through ALPRs to determine whether the travel was as stated. There was reasonable suspicion to continue the stop 15 minutes for that. United States v. Moore, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124571 (D. Minn. June 5, 2026).
The government had exigent circumstances to seize defendant’s hard drive without a warrant because he repeatedly went into the room to get it and didn’t produce it. The government was legitimately concerned that digital evidence could be deleted. Martin v. State, 2026 Ga. App. LEXIS 270 (June 3, 2026).*
Defendant disclaimed any interest in two safes found in the vehicle he was driving claiming they belonged to his mother. This was abandonment. United States v. Burse, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122455 (S.D. Miss. June 3, 2026).*
Plaintiff sues pro se for herself as plaintiff alleging unreasonable seizure of her children. Not in this circuit. Fisk v. Okla. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124877 (E.D. Okla. May 4, 2026).*
Plaintiff was arrested because the officers reasonably believed there was a warrant for his arrest. “When Vince provided documentation that the warrant had been lifted, the officers confirmed the information and released him, which was reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and no violation occurred. The District Court committed no error in dismissing Vince’s Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment.” Vince v. Godlewski, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 16017 (3d Cir. June 3, 2026).
“On interlocutory appeal from denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment stage, where undisputed facts showed armed teenager fled from officer during 42-second chase, ignored commands, briefly crouched, then continued running while turning head toward officer but made no threatening movements with weapon, officer’s use of deadly force violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights because mere possession of weapon and flight, without threatening weapon movement, cannot justify deadly force.” Ruffin v. Davis, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 12352 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2026).*
The state search warrant in this case was not served within three days as required by Ohio law. That did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and he shows no prejudice. United States v. Calhoun, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121202 (N.D. Ohio June 2, 2026). [Note: A delayed served search warrant can become stale by waiting; but not here.]
Defendant’s admissions in a mobile home that were recorded from another room through thin walls were “oral communications” under Florida law and excluded. Judkins v. State, 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4209 (Fla. 1st DCA June 3, 2026).*
An NOPD crime lab employee on leave was ordered to work for a drug test. He refused. He states a Fourth Amendment claim. Derhaar v. Watson, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 15876 (5th Cir. June 2, 2026).*
Defendant’s mere allegation of a false statement in support of the warrant here doesn’t warrant a hearing. State v. Cherry, 2016 NH 22, 2026 N.H. LEXIS 94 (June 3, 2026).*
Exigency justified entry into defendant’s apartment. The tenant below called 911 to report a shooting down through his ceiling and gunshots above. People v. Santiago, 2026 NY Slip Op 03398 (1st Dept. June 2, 2026).
“Ms. Sandoval next asserts that officers from the Nampa Police Department violated her Fourth Amendment rights by ‘engag[ing] in detention and enforcement actions regarding asking questions in high risk and unsafe situations (during traffic stops etc.) about plaintiff’s at the time boyfriend.’ Dkt. 20 ¶ 17. She also states that this questioning put her ‘at risk from gang member retaliation.’ Id. None of these factual allegations, if true, rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation. Asking questions during an otherwise lawful traffic stop is not an unreasonable search or seizure, and the potential gang retaliation, while unsettling, appears completely irrelevant. Ms. Sandoval’s claim again consists of legal conclusions without the factual support required under Rule 8.” No further leave to amend. This is the third try. Sandoval v. Idaho Dep’t of Health, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120609 (D. Idaho June 1, 2026).*
Posted inEmergency / exigency, Seizure|Comments Off on NY1: Gunshot through floor from apartment above was exigency
Reason: Most Civil Forfeiture Victims Never See the Inside of a Courtroom by J.D. Tuccille (“Modest reforms have helped, but civil forfeiture remains legalized theft by government agencies.” “Two years ago, the Netflix film Rebel Ridge turned a common law enforcement tactic into a cinematic study of injustice. In fictionalized form, the movie brought home to audiences the reality that civil asset forfeiture is nothing more than legalized theft. Unfortunately, as documented in a recent Institute for Justice (I.J.) report, while several states have sought to reform the use of civil forfeiture, it remains a source of profit for many law enforcement agencies and a cause of grief to unlucky victims who rarely get to argue their cases in a courtroom … ‘Most forfeitures never reach a courtroom, available data show. For example, in a large sample of Indiana cases, just 4% were decided by a judge. Instead, forfeiture typically happens by default,’ the recent report notes.”)
Posted inForfeiture|Comments Off on Reason: Most Civil Forfeiture Victims Never See the Inside of a Courtroom
Admission in evidence of the anonymous tip that led to defendant’s stop violated the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Simpson, 25-1263 (8th Cir. June 2, 2026).
The search warrants here were subject to the Privacy Protection Act, and they were rejected by the court. The government attempted a redo and then withdrew the warrant application. In re Search Warrants, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119672 (D. Minn. May 22, 2026).*
Defendant’s blood draw was consensual. He wasn’t a police target at first, and he voluntarily went to the police station and wasn’t in custody. People v. Demolle, 2026 Cal. LEXIS 3008 (June 1, 2026).*
The four corners of the search warrant affidavit showed probable cause for the search of defendant’s vehicle. United States v. Yarbough, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120149 (W.D. Pa. June 1, 2026).*
An anonymous report to a school official the juvenile was smoking pot in class justified a search of his backpack under T.L.O. Suppression order reversed. People in interest of T.J.W., 2026 CO 38 (June 1, 2026).
Defendant’s parole search was more intrusive than most, but not all, and it was still reasonable. United States v. Butler, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 15730 (2d Cir. June 2, 2026).*
Appellant didn’t show that he was prejudiced by the lack of an expiration date in a search warrant when it was timely executed anyway. Rule 41 violations don’t require suppression. CoA denied for that. Odubajo v. United States, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 15594 (6th Cir. May 29, 2026).
Individual texts provided probable cause to get a warrant for defendant’s Instagram account for evidence of drug trafficking. United States v. Franklin (In re United States), 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 15566 (8th Cir. June 1, 2026).*
The informant’s lie to get into defendant’s house to video him making a drug deal with the CI didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966). United States v. Warick, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 15538 (6th Cir. May 28, 2026).
“The Dash Cam and Body Cam video reflect that Officer App requested a K9 officer and back-up units after observing the two cell phones and the cash scattered on the front passenger seat of Mr. Jordan’s vehicle under a bag. When requesting backup, Officer App also mentioned to the dispatcher Mr. Jordan’s prior convictions for being a serious violent felon, possession of narcotics and machine guns, and dealing drugs, which he had learned of when he performed a search on Indiana MyCase. When another officer arrived on the scene, Officer App told him ‘he’s got quite a bit of currency in the front passenger seat and he has two phones. That’s enough for me to get a dog.’ [Body Cam at 07:10-07:20.]” United States v. Jordan, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117671 (S.D. Ind. May 28, 2026).*
Reasonable suspicion developed after the stop, and that justified extending it. United States v. Mitchell, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117454 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2026),*
Posted inInformant hearsay, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on CA6: CI’s lie to get into def’s house to video him making a drug deal with the CI didn’t violate 4A
“In this case, the evidence was that, although the Defendant lived in the van, the van was registered to someone else, and the vehicle registration indicated the same. The doors to the van were wide open and it was parked in a public lot. Thus, the trial court ruled that the Defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the vehicle and, therefore, lacked standing to challenge the search of the van and the seizure of the items found inside.” State v. Rodgers, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 315 (May 26, 2026).*
The warrant affidavit mentioned gun parts and a 3D printer shipped to defendant’s place. “Defendant next asserts that the search warrant application failed to establish a nexus between any criminal activity and the Target Location. Specifically, defendant suggests that it is ‘a leap of conjecture’ to assume that gun parts and the 3D printer, all of which were shipped to the Target Location, would be found therein. The Court is underwhelmed.” United States v. Butland, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118932 (D. Mass. May 29, 2026).*
Defendant’s Franks affidavit seeking to justify a hearing that he denies what the officer said in the affidavit for warrant is not a “substantial preliminary showing” under First Circuit precedent. This is essentially an effort at cross-examination. United States v. Rivera-Fernández, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118989 (D.P.R. May 27, 2026).*
The suppression of the cell phone is affirmed. The telephonic warrant omitted to mention what it was that the police were seizing. The ubiquity of cell phones isn’t carte blanche to seize any cell phone in a defendant’s possession. There has to be nexus between it and the offense being investigated, and that’s not shown here. People v. Matthew, 2026 VI 9 (May 28, 2026).
Defendant was a passenger in a car lawfully stopped. He has standing to challenge his stop, but not that of the others, and he has standing to the seizure of his cell phone, not the other five found in the car. United States v. Arnold, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 15545 (6th Cir. May 29, 2026).*
The warrant for records is claimed to be overbroad, but it’s limited by the crimes under investigation. United States v. Andrixon, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118482 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2026).*
Defendant’s stop for a license plate frame that covered part of the LPN was reasonable. Shining a flashlight into the car the officer thought he saw a baggie of drugs, and that was reasonable suspicion to call for a drug dog. People v. Brooks, 2026 NYLJ LEXIS 854 (Tomkins Co. May 29, 2026).*
Posted inCell phones, Nexus|Comments Off on VI: Despite ubiquity of cell phones, nexus has to be shown to alleged crime
A PIT maneuver here was not excessive force. Defendant repeatedly refused to stop and even after attempted PIT maneuvers kept fleeing. United States v. Damons, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118141 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 2, 2026):
The juvenile here acted like he was carrying a weapon and he had on a ski mask in June in New Orleans. That was reasonable suspicion. State In the Int. of L.V., 2026 La. App. LEXIS 1070 (La. App. 4 Cir May 28, 2026).*
The warrant application had a false statement in it, but it wasn’t material to the probable cause finding. United States v. Jamea, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 15365 (3d Cir. May 29, 2026).*
The exclusionary rule doesn’t apply in immigration proceedings. Zamacona v. Blanche, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 15416 (9th Cir. May 27, 2026).*
Defense counsel challenged the method by which the government obtained financial records, allegedly in violation of the Fourth Amendment. This was all waived by his guilty plea. United States v. Deloe, 2026 CCA LEXIS 253 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 29, 2026).*
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
