S.D.Ohio: DEA agents tailing a car can request marked unit to make a traffic stop for violations they saw

DEA agents following defendant in an unmarked car observed traffic violations, and they requested a marked unit to make a stop, which was valid. United States v. Peterson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90905 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2026).*

A state prosecution was based on a video that was inconclusive, and it failed. There was at least arguable probable cause for the arrest, and that’s enough for qualified immunity. Puller v. Greco, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11777 (10th Cir. Apr. 24, 2026).*

The search warrant materials were in existence in 2016, and they aren’t newly discovered evidence for his 2024 post-conviction petition. State v. Sanchez, 2026-Ohio-1497 (5th Dist. Apr. 24, 2026).*

The dashcam caught defendant wandering over the fog line before the stop, and the trial court credited that. State v. Jackson, 2026-Ohio-1486 (4th Dist. Apr. 16, 2026).*

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M.D.Ala.: Officer’s adhering to particularity wasn’t a failure to uncover Brady information

“To the contrary, this testimony confirms only that Agent Evans’s forensic examination was circumscribed by the legal boundaries of the search warrant. Cox’s attempt to equate the examiner’s adherence to those boundaries with a failure to uncover exculpatory evidence is a logical non sequitur; the ex post argument—that the examiner’s failure to search for viruses or other files that would negate Cox’s intent constitutes forensic malpractice—is exactly the kind of ‘undeveloped assertion[]’ that the Eleventh Circuit has held insufficient to satisfy Moore. …” Cox v. Jones, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90829 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2026).*

Defendant’s stop was for an object hanging from the rearview mirror. When the officer got to the car, reasonable suspicion for marijuana use developed: a baggie on the floor and it looked like the driver had recently consumed. United States v. Hallmon, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11674 (8th Cir. Apr. 24, 2026).*

Defendant passenger had no standing to contest the search of the glove compartment of the car he was riding in. United States v. Cubias, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90807 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 23, 2026).*

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W.D.Tenn.: Facebook SW for evidence of gang activity was particular enough, considering context

This Facebook warrant for information about gang activity was based on probable cause and was particular enough, considering the context of what the government was looking for. In any event, it wasn’t so bad that the good faith exception didn’t apply. United States v. Merriweather, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90304 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 15, 2026):

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CA10: Tribal and state court SWs: state judge wanted more information, but that didn’t make tribal warrant lack PC

Defendant lived on tribal lands with a co-occupant who was not Native American. Officers obtained two search warrants: one from a tribal court and one from a state court. The applications were identical. The state judge, however, wanted more information, so an additional affidavit was provided. That didn’t make the tribal warrant lack probable cause. Also, the good faith exception applied in any event. United States v. Holt, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11782 (10th Cir. Apr. 24, 2026).

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not moving to suppress a search where defendant had no standing in the vehicle at issue. Defendant also complained about the lack of a Franks motion where there was nothing proffered. Vance v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87600 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 21, 2026).*

Plaintiff had apparent mental issues, and her resistance did not justify the force used against her. She had no weapon. Driscoll v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11624 (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 2026).*

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OR: Voluntary consent to a blood draw after accident and pain meds in hospital

Defendant voluntarily consented to a blood draw for DUII at the hospital despite having been in an accident and received pain medication. State v. Miller, 375 Or. 173 (Apr. 23, 2026).

There was probable cause to put a tracking device on defendant’s car by court order, and, in any event, the good faith exception applied. He appealed only the probable cause finding, which was affirmed. People v. Eastman, 2026 Colo. App. LEXIS 672 (Apr. 16, 2026).* (In most states, not appealing the good faith ruling would have ended the matter.)

Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant because he was in a high crime area and feeling around his waist, covered with a letterman jacket tied by the sleeves, as a “security check” for a firearm. When they encountered him, he lied about it, too. United States v. Applewhite, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87751 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2026).*

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W.D.Wash.: SDT to Seattle Children’s Hospital was pretextual

On the government’s motion to alter or amend judgment, these health care fraud subpoenas to Seattle Children’s Hospital seek too much private patient information and are also found to be pretextual. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum No. 25-1431-016, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89932 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 23, 2026):

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N.D.Ga.: A filter team not required to examine seized photographs

A filter team wasn’t required to examine seized photographs. Overseizure doesn’t make a search unreasonable unless it was flagrant, and this wasn’t. United States v. Alford, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87350 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2026).

“Even if the pre-warrant look was unlawful, the results of the subsequent search remain valid under the independent source doctrine. … The District Court found (and Chapman does not challenge) that the officers would have applied for the search warrant even without seeing Chapman’s belongings inside the apartment. Additionally, the warrant application established probable cause without the information gleaned from the officers’ look inside the apartment.” United States v. Chapman, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11417 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2026).*

An administrative subpoena for subscriber payment information on an internet account has no constitutional protection under Carpenter. Commonwealth v. Zealor, 2026 PA Super 81 (Apr. 22, 2026).*

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CA5: Officer’s touching parent’s arm to get her through a school door for four seconds was de minimis

In a school grounds dispute, a parent’s arm was grabbed for four seconds to move her through a doorway. “Under the circumstances, we cannot say that such de minimis force was ‘clearly’ excessive and unreasonable. … Dupuy knew that the Department was investigating potential child abuse and that it had instructed the school not to release the girl to the Carters’ custody. Carter was visibly upset, demanded custody of her child, and refused to comply with Dupuy’s instructions. For the safety of everyone involved, Dupuy removed Carter from the office. Once Carter was outside, Dupuy ceased all force. We hold that the force used by Dupuy was de minimis, and that Carter suffered no violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court thus erred in denying qualified immunity.” Carter v. Dupuy, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11159 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2026).

Defense counsel in the post-conviction hearing couldn’t remember why he didn’t file a motion to suppress a car because of a single GSR particle found two months after the crime. The court implies defendant’s standing was doubtful. His allegation of what he would have proved at a suppression hearing by calling his friends to show his connection to the car was potentially self-defeating because they could be questioned about his connection to the car. Instead, defense counsel crossed on the weight to be given the single GSR particle which was reasonable. Malcolm v. State, 2026 Ga. LEXIS 108 (Apr. 21, 2026).*

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N.D.Ohio: Where 1 of 10 officers in a search wore a bodycam, that doesn’t mean the others couldn’t be credible

“Harris also questions the ‘credibility’ of the officers executing the search warrant because only 1 out of 10 officers … wore a body camera at any point during the search. But other than generalized complaints about the lack of body camera recordings and vague suspicions about what alleged misconduct those recordings might have contained if made, Harris does not allege any officer in fact engaged in coercive behavior off camera. Harris fails to show he suffered any prejudice from the absence of additional recording because he was present during the search and has personal knowledge of what occurred. And he does not identify any case in which a court concluded a defendant’s constitutional rights were violated due to the mere absence of video recordings.” United States v. Harris, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87267 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 2026).

Even assuming defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the Google search warrant, defendant could not show what evidence was obtained from that warrant or how it was used at trial. The State’s cell phone location evidence came from separate, unchallenged carrier records. Without demonstrating how the challenged evidence affected the trial outcome, he cannot establish the reasonable probability of a different result required under Strickland. Bailey v. State, 2026 Ga. LEXIS 111 (Apr. 21, 2026).*

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CA9: Illegal arrest doesn’t justify dismissal of indictment

An illegal arrest doesn’t justify dismissing an indictment. He also did not show outrageous governmental conduct. United States v. Colfax, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11426 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2026).

The officer knew Dodge pickup trucks, and the registration on file didn’t match the vehicle year or engine sound. The stop was reasonable. United States v. Langston, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88446 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 21, 2026).*

The Fourth Amendment validity of an immigration arrest has nothing to do with deportability (I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza). Masabanda v. Anda-Ybarra, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88322 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2026).*

Based on a license plate and tint violation, officer stopped the car which smelled of marijuana. Defendants’ challenging behavior, physical resistance to detention, interference with law enforcement efforts, and ultimate flight from the scene gave the officers probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime, so that the warrantless search of the vehicle was lawful under the automobile exception. People v. Henderickson, 2026 V.I. LEXIS 16 (Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2026).*

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DE: Doesn’t violate 4A to have bodycam on during SW execution

It doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to execute a search warrant with a bodycam on. Defendant cites no authority, either. State v. Williams, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 183 (Apr. 22, 2026):

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E.D.Mich.: Possible 5A violation in obtaining cell phone passcode mooted by inevitable discovery; they’d get into it anyway

The government obtained defendant’s cell phone passcode by questioning him. Despite the potential Fifth Amendment violation, the court finds that the cell phone would have been opened by the government’s forensics team anyway, so inevitable discovery applies. United States v. Ahmad, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88794 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2026).

Defendant’s stop may have been pretextual, but there was an objective basis for it. State v. Winslow, 2026 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 228 (Apr. 23, 2026).*

“After independent review, the Court is satisfied that Judge Markovich’s recommendation is sound. Agent Ramirez provided several distinct factors that contributed to his decision to stop Defendant’s vehicle: Defendant was driving near the border on a route known for smuggling, he was behaving nervously and seemed to be hyper-focused on Agent Ramirez’s vehicle, and the vehicle had characteristics of vehicles that, in Agent Ramirez’s training and experience, are often used for smuggling (e.g., it was an older vehicle with temporary plates and looked to be weighed down). Under the totality of the circumstances, these factors gave rise to reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Minfee, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85822 (D. Ariz. Apr. 20, 2026),* adopting 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57635 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2026).*

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CA3: Cell phone warrant for CSAM could be broad because of possible hiding and misidentifying files

This CSAM cell phone warrant was broad, but that’s a recognition that files could have false names to hide them. It was not unreasonable. United States v. Daniels, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11323 (3d Cir. Apr. 21, 2026):

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DC: Affidavit for SW for cell phone showed no PC or nexus to crime

The search warrant for defendant’s phone showed nothing about probable cause to believe any evidence would be on it. The mere fact he likely carried the phone with him all the time isn’t enough. (But the court concedes maybe it’s not that hard to show nexus, but here there wasn’t any.) Gibbs v. United States, 2026 D.C. App. LEXIS 129 (Apr. 23, 2026) (argued Oct. 25, 2022):

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MS: Def consented to entry to look for his missing mother

Police entry onto defendant’s house and yard because his mother, who he lived with, was missing, and relatives called the police. After looking in the house for her, they found her decapitated in the back yard, then they got a search warrant. The initial entry was based on consent shown on bodycam. He knew of his right to refuse because he first asked about a warrant and then agreed. Inevitable discovery also applied because they were about to find her body in the back yard. (His insanity defense was rejected by the jury.) Johnson v. State, 2026 Miss. LEXIS 110 (Apr. 23, 2026).*

Plaintiff was a BLM protestor shot with a pepperball while peacefully protesting. Plaintiff’s excessive force verdict affirmed. Epps v. Christian, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11265 (10th Cir. Apr. 21, 2026).*

The trial court held that defendant’s DMV information wasn’t private, despite the stop, but it didn’t decide whether there was justification for the stop. Remanded for that. People v. Ehinmiakhena, 2026 NY Slip Op 02363, 2026 N.Y. LEXIS 532 (Apr. 21, 2026).*

There was reasonable suspicion for continuing this stop because the car had left a known drug house where a passenger got in with a bag from the house, they were driving to another drug house, the passengers were extremely nervous, and there was a search warrant out for one of the passengers. United States v. Lundholm, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11267 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2026).*

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N.D.Cal.: Detailed collection of video viewing information survives motion to dismiss

Plaintiff alleged a privacy interest in video viewing information where defendant “collected detailed video viewing information to package individuals into audiences based, for example, on their political leanings because they watched the State of the Union, or ‘liberal affinity news,’ or ‘conservative affinity news.’” Plaintiffs have shown standing for a potential violation from collecting detailed user information. Dellasala v. Samba TV, Inc., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88089 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2026)*:

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N.D.Ga.: OnStar’s data collection survives motion to dismiss, at least for now

In a case over OnStar’s data collection of driving information, GM’s motion to dismiss at this stage of the litigation is denied. While there is no reasonable expectation of privacy of what is seen on the highways, more is involved in this data collection. In re Consumer Vehicle Driving Data Tracking Collection, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88272 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 22, 2026)*:

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MA: Two isolated controlled buys 20 days before SW issued were stale

The officer’s false statement he was present for a third controlled buy satisfied Franks and was excised. Defense counsel showed that it couldn’t have happened. The remainder says two controlled buys, and these were found to be isolated transactions, the last was 20 days before the warrant issued. Because drugs dissipate relatively quickly, the warrant was stale when it issued. Suppression affirmed. Commonwealth v. Mallory, 106 Mass. App. Ct. 689 (Apr. 21, 2026).

State habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was barred by Stone because he had the opportunity to raise it in state court. Gardiner v. Howard, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11124 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026).*

In a tax case, there was nexus to defendant’s home office for a warrant for records. The tax business operated from there. United States v. Conner, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85414 (D. Colo. Apr. 17, 2026).*

Defendant’s arrest for a hand-to-hand drug sale justified a search incident. Guzman v. State, 2026 Md. App. LEXIS 456 (App. Apr. 17, 2026).*

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SCOTUS: Geofence warrant oral argument Monday

Chatrie v. United States, 25-112 (cert. granted Jan. 16, 2026; argument April 27, 2026) (ScotusBlog). Question presented: Whether the execution of the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.

It can be heard live at https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio/2025 10 am EDT.

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CA6: Calling def a “fugitive” in the warrant affidavit wasn’t a Franks violation

The use of the word “fugitive” to describe defendant wasn’t shown to be a Franks violation. He insisted he wasn’t a fugitive. It wasn’t shown to be reckless or knowing. United States v. Brown, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11017 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026).*

Defendant’s stop was with reasonable suspicion. The warrant for his house was based on a CI whose information was corroborated. United States v. Sheehan, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11013 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2026).*

“Even if Officer Tapia’s act of opening the door constituted a Fourth Amendment violation, suppression would not be warranted because the challenged evidence was discovered through an independent source:” plain view. United States v. Aguirre, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 11090 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2026).*

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