An administrative search that is a ruse for a criminal search was clearly established at the time this one happened. Qualified immunity denied. Generis Ent., LLC v. Donley, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5197 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2026).
Not the court’s words, but: Defendant’s arguments about alternative theories about the meaning of the facts in the affidavit for warrant amount to speculation and not even an offer proof for a Franks violation. United States v. Knight, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35378 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2026).* Of similar tenor: United States v. Gogolack, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35413 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2026),* a connected case, with different speculation.
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a backpack he apparently dumped in hiding from the police. United States v. Méndez-Rodríguez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35561 (D.P.R. Feb. 20, 2026).*
Defendant’s frisk on entering a VA hospital could be justified as an area entry search, but the facts known to the officers, that defendant was already considered a safety risk, justified it by reasonable suspicion under Terry. United States v. Meier, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35836 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2026).
Defendant’s cell phones weren’t searched within the time period of the warrant, so the officers got an extension order which is valid on its own or by the good faith exception. Seven months total wasn’t too long. United States v. Langford, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5280 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026).*
A marijuana conspiracy was alleged to be motive for a murder, and defendant had no standing to make a Fourth Amendment claim for someone else. United States v. Mosley, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5290 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026).*
When a person on parole owns property and lets others use or rent it, the others aren’t subject to the parolee’s search waiver. United States v. Perez, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5305 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026):
Posted inProbation / Parole search|Comments Off on CA4: Leasing property from a parolee doesn’t make that property subject to his parole search condition
Defendant was driving a borrowed car without a valid DL. He still has standing, and that’s not conditioned on a driver’s license. United States v. Huggins, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34758 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2026).
Defendant’s vehicle was parked unlocked and with the keys inside. It was “readily mobile” for the automobile exception. State v. Medina, 2026 ND 45 (Feb. 19, 2026).*
Officers had probable cause for the automobile exception based on information defendant had 10,000 fentanyl pills in his car. United States v. Siberón-Flusa, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35172 (D.P.R. Feb. 12, 2026).*
Posted inAutomobile exception, Standing|Comments Off on D.N.J.: One without a DL can still have standing in the car he’s driving
“Considering the totality of the circumstances, there are insufficient facts before the court to establish reasonable suspicion that would allow Officer Embley to prolong the stop and inquire about Kummer’s drug history. Reasonable suspicion is a low standard, but it is not so low that a person with prior drug charges loses their Fourth Amendment rights whenever they drive an uninsured vehicle belonging to someone with a suspended license. More than the facts as pled here is necessary to satisfy qualified immunity at this stage. Accordingly, Kummer has plausibly alleged Officer Embley violated her constitutional rights.” Moreover, “Kummer’s Right Is Clearly Established.” Kummer v. Embley, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34695 (D. Utah Feb. 19, 2026).
2254 petitioner doesn’t get a motion to reconsider to put on new evidence to overcome the AEDPA standard of unreasonable application of federal law. McGee v. Warden, Belmont Corr. Inst., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35087 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2026).
2254 petitioner had several opportunities to litigate his suppression motion in state court, and he’s Stone barred. He just doesn’t like the denial of his suppression motions, which is not for federal litigation. Dunbar v. Annucci, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35336 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2026).*
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in what is shared with a cloud AI program, even if it’s in anticipation of litigation. Therefore, no attorney-client privilege in what the client shares with AI trying to help his attorney. United States v. Heppner, No. 1:25-cr-00503-JSR (S.D. N.Y. Feb. 17, 2026). [I’m waiting for the case where the AI provider gets a search warrant for an AI history on a suspect. That’s probably already happened. That’s a logical step from search history warrants.]
Plaintiff plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment violation for a warrantless entry into his house without any exigent circumstances shown by the officers. Harvey v. Montiel, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5156 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 2026).*
Defendant punched his stepfather who lived with him and broke his nose. He temporarily vacated, had his key, and intended to retrieve stuff. He still had apparent authority to consent to a search. [Not far from the facts of Illinois v. Rodriguez.] United States v. Estadella, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5177 (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2026).
Plaintiff didn’t sufficiently plead a Fourth Amendment violation and overcoming qualified immunity from the officer’s seizing his notebook and perusing it and handing it to another officer. It’s his burden to deal with qualified immunity, and he didn’t adequately respond. Trover v. Oglesby, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5017 (7th Cir. Feb. 18, 2026).
The police dog bite and hold for 30 seconds to extract plaintiff from climbing into an attic was covered by qualified immunity. Plaintiff had assaulted someone, and he was fleeing. Hays v. Adams, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34385 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2026).*
2254 petitioner’s CSLI claim was made and trial occurred all before Carpenter, and the holding was correct on existing law. Stone bars relitigating it. It was correct at the time, and petitioner used the state procedures to challenge it. Ruiz v. Walker, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34191 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2026).*
An arrest warrant isn’t constitutionally required for a felony arrest. Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 2026 Ky. LEXIS 7 (Feb. 19, 2026).
There was no rationale entitlement to discovery of the name of the informant in this case, so defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not asking for it. McKinney v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34995 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 2026).*
Parking behind defendant’s already parked car in a parking lot was not a seizure. State v. Powell, 2026-Ohio-592 (5th Dist. Feb. 19, 2026).*
Defendant argues the automobile exception doesn’t apply, but the real issue here is abandonment of the car. United States v. Marion, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35063 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 20, 2026).*
Plaintiff sued while his criminal trespass case was pending in state municipal court. The action is stayed because plaintiff can raise his constitutional claims there. Younger also counsels that. Spiehs v. Allen, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35038 (D. Kan. Feb. 20, 2026).
The police dog bite and hold for 30 seconds to extract plaintiff from climbing into an attic was covered by qualified immunity. Plaintiff had assaulted someone, and he was fleeing. Hays v. Adams, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34385 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2026).*
Parking behind defendant’s already parked car in a parking lot was not a seizure. State v. Powell, 2026-Ohio-592 (5th Dist. Feb. 19, 2026).*
“The district court correctly held that the officers did not violate Torres’s Fourth Amendment rights by asking him whether he was armed. The officer’s question to Torres, which took no more than three seconds to ask and answer, did not unconstitutionally prolong the stop. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (The ‘Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen the roadside detention.’). Indeed, the entire interaction unfolded in less than twenty seconds. We need not decide whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk Torres, because Torres ran away from the officers immediately after he was asked whether he was armed, and Torres does not dispute that the officers were permitted to pursue and restrain him based on this conduct.” United States v. Torres, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5118 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2026).
The officer was trained in the odor of burnt fentanyl [albeit nowhere near as much as burnt marijuana], and that was probable cause. State v. Grounds, 2026 Ida. App. LEXIS 9 (Feb. 20, 2026).*
Plaintiff finances cars. When Suffolk County seized the cars from the buyers, they were allegedly really slow in returning them to Santander. Plaintiff admits the initial seizure was lawful, so the retention doesn’t ipso facto violate the Fourth Amendment. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. Cty. of Suffolk, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34236 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2026):
Off-site copying of defendant’s cell phone after the warrant’s expiration date was permitted by Rule 41(e)(2)(B). United States v. Hernandez, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 4990 (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2026).
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress that couldn’t win over (1) a judge in one county issuing a warrant for another county expressly permitted by state law or (2) recording a controlled buy. Horton v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34062 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 27, 2026).*
The police knew 716½ had a side stair and entrance, and the warrant was specific to that with 716 never being searched. United States v. Platek, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34091 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2026),* adopted, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32684 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 18, 2026).*
The state’s claim of exigency from potential destruction of evidence was speculative, and the motion to suppress should have been granted. As to his burglary conviction, it’s harmless, but not as to two other counts. State v. Gilliland, 347 Or. App. 256 (Feb. 19, 2026).
A computer intrusion case, defendant beat around the bush: “Vance does not assert, but rather questions, whether the search warrant was unconstitutionally vague and he avers in general fashion that some of the items seized were outside the scope of the search warrant.” “Although Vance does not raise the issue of probable cause, there was clearly probably cause to conduct searches of his property.” The search was constitutionally adequate. United States v. Vance, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33459 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2026).*
The exclusionary rule generally does not apply in federal supervised release revocation proceedings. United States v. Kitt, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 4953 (4th Cir. Feb. 19, 2026).*
The Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant be provided at the time of arrest, and an arrest can occur with probable cause and without a warrant in felony cases. Mister v. Marino, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33508 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2026).
Plaintiff may not “back door” his conviction by a § 1983 action that’s barred by Heck v. Humphrey and also by the statute of limitations. Sheffey v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33528 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2026).*
Defendant’s guilty plea waived his search claim, and he’d lose on the merits anyway. People v. Brown, 2026 NY Slip Op 00984 (1st Dept. Feb. 19, 2026).*
The officers had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and that defeats his false arrest claim. Cook v. Brooks, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 4962 (11th Cir. Feb. 19, 2026).*
“Applying those principles here, we conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant was seized, at the latest, at 8:53 a.m., when Smith’s questions changed from general questions about defendant’s or P’s identity, to more probing questions about what defendant and P’s plans were. Put differently, at that point, a reasonable person in defendant’s situation would have felt that their movement was restricted by Smith. Several factors lead us to that conclusion. …” State v. Acosta Parra, 347 Or. App. 216 (Feb. 19, 2026).
The encounter started with consent. Officers developed reasonable suspicion for a longer detention, despite later concluding that defendant wasn’t involved in the alleged criminal activity that brought them out. United States v. Dougherty, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33961 (D.S.D. Feb. 17, 2026).*
Plaintiff wife has no Art. III standing to sue over husband’s arrest. Garcia v. City of McAllen, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33902 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2026).*
In an immigration detention case, the government’s failure to respond to the petitioner’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment arguments was waiver. Eduardo R.P. v. Bondi, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33634 (D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2026).*
Coercing a suspect out of his home for a warrantless arrest violates Payton. [But here, the error is harmless on the murder and assault charges.] People v. Shaw, 2026 NY Slip Op 00961, 2026 N.Y. LEXIS 130 (Feb. 19, 2026):
The financial reporting requirements for real estate transactions under the Bank Secrecy Act satisfy the statutory requirements which are more onerous than the Fourth Amendment requires under Shultz. Therefore, there’s no Fourth Amendment violation. An inquiry can be made, as with administrative warrants, with just official curiosity. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc. v. Bessent, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33478 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2026):
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!” ---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
