“Given the above precedent, we disagree with the State that the community caretaking doctrine remains a viable purpose for a warrantless entry into a home. Instead, we believe that the Caniglia decision clearly rejected the community caretaking exception outside of the community caretaking or public safety exception for vehicles (see People v. Ursini, … (1993)). Community caretaking and emergency aid are separate activities where the one, community caretaking, could lead to an emergency aid situation necessitating a warrantless entry, but simply engaging in community caretaking in and of itself does not justify a warrantless entry into a home. We are proceeding under this understanding until such time as our supreme court provides additional guidance.” People v. Stallings, 2026 IL App (5th) 240309, 2026 Ill. App. LEXIS 339 (Aug. 31, 2026).
This apartment complex had serious police calls at least weekly, including an accidental firearm discharge call earlier that day. Seeing a juvenile carrying a firearm was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Thompson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195528 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2026).*
The search warrant after a drug overdose in the house was particular and permitted officers to open a notebook where they found drugs. State v. Pyszkowski, 2026 N.M. App. LEXIS 64 (Aug. 31, 2026).* [Case also involves an overdose immunity argument that failed.]
Defendant’s consent to a blood draw was not voluntary under the totality of circumstances. “The facts at hand demonstrate why a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is crucial. McCarthy and Haney provide that being read a coercive implied consent warning is but one factor to consider in the analysis. Each factor alone may not have rendered Damron’s consent involuntary. However, when considering Trooper Kelly’s reading of the coercive implied consent warning in the context of Damron’s entire encounter with law enforcement, the Commonwealth failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Damron gave valid consent to the blood test. Based on the totality of the circumstances, suppression of Damron’s blood test results was proper.” Damron v. Commonwealth, 2026 Ky. LEXIS 95 (Aug. 20, 2026).
Defendant lost his search claim on direct appeal, and he can’t show that he would have won it if it has been argued differently. United States v. Juneau, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193225 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2026).*
2255 petitioner’s probable cause and Franks claims are barred by Stone. United States v. Hawkins, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194733 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2026).*
A hospital collecting umbilical cord blood after a birth was not a state actor nor acting at law enforcement’s request or suggestion. This was a private search, and the blood tested positive for drugs. State v. Kawano, 2026 Ida. LEXIS 106 (Aug. 27, 2026).
Defendant’s pretextual stop claim fails because there was an objective basis for his traffic stop. United States v. Burroughs, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 26439 (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026).*
Officers had reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop for stalking. A message to the patrol car terminal said defendant could flee if he saw officers, and he started backing away when he saw them. United States v. Hoffpowier, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 26410 (6th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026).*
The only suppression issue defendant sought a hearing on was whether the magistrate abandoned her judicial role. [That’s a tough hill to climb, and] he fails to make any showing of that. United States v. Osorio, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193860 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2026).*
The search warrant for defendant’s Facebook account was overbroad where it sought ten months of information where the alleged crime was only over a couple of days and covered “illegal activities.” Despite the illegal search, the conviction is affirmed because it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Plenty of other evidence connected him. Jenkins v. State, 2026 Ga. App. LEXIS 419 (Aug. 28, 2026).
Defendant worked in a convenience store in NYC. He helped customers obtain drug paraphernalia from a nearby shed which led down to a locked basement. His motion to suppress the search of the shed as exceeding the warrant is denied. He makes no attempt to show a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, even after the government pointed it out. United States v. Ali, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197041 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2026).*
Defendant’s ten motions to suppress are denied. There was probable cause, nexus, and particularity, and the magistrate was neutral and detached. His Franks motion fails, too. United States v. Oboite, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194470 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2026).*
WaPo: Americans have turned against police cameras that track license plates, new survey shows by Drew Harwell, Douglas MacMillan, Aaron Schaffer and Kevin Crowe (“Fearing the potential for invasive monitoring or abuse, more people now oppose law enforcement’s use of AI-powered cameras than support it, a new survey shows.” “More Americans now oppose law enforcement’s use of the technology than support it, a reversal from last year as a growing backlash raises concerns about its potential for invasive monitoring and police misuse.”)
What is the duty of the neutral and detached magistrate? It’s explained in In re A Search of A Certain Apple iCloud Acct., 2026 WL 2534328, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193213 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2026):
“With the benefit of advocacy and adversarial briefing, it is easy to look back over Special Agent Bell’s affidavit and reflect on the facts that are missing or additional investigative steps that could have been taken but were not. But the task before me is to evaluate the facts set out within the four corners of the affidavit and decide whether the Magistrate Judge had no substantial basis for concluding that probable cause had been met. Chiu, 36 F.4th at 297.” United States v. Bridges, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193226 (D. Me. Aug. 27, 2026).
Defendant’s claim he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle search is unpreserved. People v. Sessoms, 2026 NY Slip Op 05117 (2d Dept. Aug. 26, 2026).*
Plaintiff’s complaint against individuals at the University of California for judicial deception for a misleading affidavit for search warrant is barred by limitations. Generally, a person is usually on notice of the search when it happens. Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192985 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2026).*
“Defendants also assert that the Government withheld impeaching information about Ferrante. Ferrante, however, did not testify at trial and only served as the affiant for a key search warrant. Brady does not entitle a defendant to disclosures of impeaching information as to a search warrant affiant. See Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 815-16 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining distinction between duties under Brady and Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)); United States v. Banks, 104 F.4th 496, 509 n.3 (4th Cir. 2024) (‘We have never held that Brady and Giglio apply to evidence bearing on the warrant-application stage as opposed to evidence admitted at trial.’).” United States v. Miner, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 26233 (3d Cir. Aug. 27, 2026).
Defendant was alleged to have attempted to buy a mailbox key from a postal worker, and the postal worker described him. There was no photo array. Based on their investigation the Postal Inspector had enough for probable cause to show that it was defendant and supported the warrant for his place. He had no standing as to the cell phone in his girlfriend’s purse. United States v. Hudson, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191779 (D. Minn. Aug. 7, 2026).*
Defendant gave an old cell phone to his niece. On it, she found child pornography, and she took it to the police who she showed images and texts. The officer didn’t search. She had apparent authority to consent to search of the phone. United States v. Lewis, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192542 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 2026).
The search here occurred just before the Ohio courts started holding that the advent of recreational marijuana meant the smell of marijuana in a car wasn’t probable cause. The trial court didn’t rule on good faith, and it’s remanded to the trial court to determine that. State v. Anderson, 2026-Ohio-3329 (1st Dist. Aug. 26, 2026).*
There were two search warrants for two properties of defendant, and one the state wouldn’t rely on at trial. The affidavits were similar and supported each other. The state’s failure to put the one into evidence that didn’t matter to them didn’t justify suppressing the other. State v. Brooks, 2026 La. App. LEXIS 1681 (La. App. 4 Cir Aug. 26, 2026).*
The military judge erred in concluding that a search warrant for computer information became stale. It was essentially frozen without change while in the government’s custody. United States v. Armour, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 712 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 24, 2026).
There was probable cause for a DNA warrant based on a 22-page affidavit for defendant’s DNA after an extensive information and excluding his siblings. “These facts set forth in the affidavit, which were not easily obtained, corroborated the informant’s tip and provided sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s probable cause determination. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence Hollowell’s DNA results.” Hollowell v. State, 2026 Ind. App. LEXIS 287 (Aug. 24, 2026).*
2255 petitioner’s petition with Fourth Amendment claims is denied on statute of limitations grounds. Harris v. Martin, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190656 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2026).*
The military judge’s restrictive determination of particularity to exclude evidence while relying on a Tenth Circuit case instead of precedent from this court was an abuse of discretion. The incorporated affidavit was sufficient to show probable cause and particularity under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Ixcolgonzalez, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 711 (C.A.A.F. Aug. 24, 2026).
Defendant pro se didn’t complain that his standby counsel wasn’t present for his suppression hearing. Not preserved, and on plain error review, no error. United States v. Howard, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 25880 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 2026).*
“[I]mmigration detention is civil in nature under these circumstances, and thus, the cases decided under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are inapplicable. Zadvydas v. Davis, … (2001).” Doe v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190383 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2026).*
The officer here detected defendant’s body odor as coming from heroin use, despite his lack of specific training. That was enough to order defendant out of the car and reasonable suspicion developed. United States v. Marshall, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 26025 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 2026).
There was probable cause to arrest defendant for felon in possession. The witness was attempting to serve defendant with an order of protection, and defendant answered the door with a gun in hand. The witness told the police who ran defendant’s name and found he had a felony prior. That was probable cause. United States v. Payne, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189246 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2026).*
There was reasonable suspicion for detaining a package coming to defendant’s house. The government extensively investigated the package in the United States which was being internet tracked from Mexico. United States v. Torres, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 25492 (8th Cir. Aug. 24, 2026).*
There is no interlocutory appeal of denial of a motion to suppress in the federal system. United States v. Cox, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 25677 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 2026).
Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not making a frivolous motion to suppress defendant’s probation search done by law enforcement rather than a PO. Rice v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189335 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 21, 2026).*
There was probable cause for the warrant for defendant’s house with nexus shown. United States v. Martinez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189964 (W.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2026).*
2255 petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to file a motion to suppress fails because there was no valid ground to grant any motion to suppress. United States v. Riley, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190285 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2026).*
Defendant’s effort to subpoena five witnesses in support of his Franks challenge was properly denied. Their testimony would be material to the outcome, and they were also speculative. As to the execution of the warrant, the fact he got a copy of the warrant but without attachments isn’t a Fourth Amendment violation. (Defendant was suspected of using a computer to hack into an NFL game Jumbotron and the computer search revealed child pornography.) United States v. Thompson, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 25633 (11th Cir. Aug. 24, 2026).
There was probable cause for defendant’s arrest where he was seen picking up a person who walked across the border and got into his car. United States v. Quintero-Morales, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189224 (D. Ariz. Aug. 3, 2026).*
No Rodriguez moment occurred because the length of stop was not extended and the Ranger diligently pursued the reckless driving mission. United States v. Alba, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189133 (D. Utah Aug. 21, 2026).*
Defendant was passed out under a bridge, and the fire department and police were called. Firemen got her name and police ran a warrants check, finding one, and they arrested her. That was reasonable. State v. Willard, 2026 Kan. LEXIS 396 (Aug. 21, 2026).
The motion for reconsideration is denied. The government waited two years to get a warrant for defendant’s cell phone, and, after it was denied, it waited 67 days to reapply. The phone’s owner still had a possessory interest in the phone, and the delay was unreasonable. “The government’s motion for reconsideration does not meet this strict standard. It does not identify any controlling precedent that the Court overlooked. Daskal is neither controlling nor contrary to this Court’s analysis. The government’s alternative argument under Smith merely seeks to relitigate old issues under new theories.” In re Application for Search Warrant for Two Cellular Phones, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188952 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2026).*
“Individually, these factors would likely not provide reasonable suspicion.” Collectively, they did. People v. McKimmy, 2026 Colo. App. LEXIS 1610 (Aug. 20, 2026).*
Defendant was stopped for speeding, and he was arrested for drugs based on unidentified pills found in his lap when the officer looked in. That might have been reasonable suspicion, but it wasn’t probable cause. Therefore, the arrest and car search are invalid and suppressed. United States v. Vogel, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186990 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2026).
Breaking plaintiff’s car window and pulling him out here was justified by his uncooperativeness and refusing to keep his hands visible. For 14 minutes he refused to show his DL or get out when directed. “Balancing the nature of the intrusion against the severity of the suspected offense, the potential threat to officer safety, and Plaintiff’s continued resistance, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude that the force used in arresting Plaintiff was objectively unreasonable.” Basargin v. City of Homer, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187097 (D. Alaska Aug. 20, 2026).*
Search warrants run to the place, not the person in alleged control. Here, there were nine cell phones found. The affidavit didn’t infer they all belonged to one defendant, but since they were found there, that was enough to search them under the warrant. United States v. Davis, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187118 (D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2026).*
It was reasonable for officers to conclude that evidence or instrumentalities of the crime would be found in the car used in a robbery. A mistaken description of the location of the car in the warrant was neither intentional nor reckless for Franks. “In sum, although we decline to opine on whether the 9-1-1 call, dialed to determine the number connected to the Samsung device, constituted an unlawful search for which the Detective should have obtained a warrant, we hold that the evidence obtained from the phone would have been inevitably discovered because the phone number itself was ultimately immaterial to whether the search warrant would have been granted.” United States v. Onyewu, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 25421 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2026).*
The officer’s question about a thing in the car was not related to the traffic stop, and it extended the stop. The court finds, however, that the government showed inevitable discovery applied, and the evidence will not be suppressed. Also, the stop was valid for lack of a turn signal, and the fact the officer couldn’t see whether hand signal was used doesn’t undermine the stop. [How long has it been since any of us has seen a hand signal from a car? Bicycle, yes.] United States v. Drew, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188321 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2026).*
Defendant and his girlfriend were breaking up, and she validly consented to entry into the home, but she didn’t have apparent authority to consent to entry into his safe in the house. United States v. Ricker, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188230 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 2026).*
Google and others flagged apparent CSAM by hash value alone and reported them to NCMEC which forwarded them to police where the IP address was. The officer viewed the images without a warrant and found them with names suggesting they were CSAM, and he conducted other investigation. The government could have done more, but there was probable cause by “a hair’s breadth.” United States v. Braun, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 25399 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 2026).
The officer’s reliance on the search warrant here was objectively reasonable, and the good faith exception applies. There also was probable cause and the information was not stale. United States v. Williams, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188317 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2026).*
The officer’s queries during the stop were all related to officer safety and didn’t unreasonably prolong the stop. United States v. Birry, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 25435 (3d Cir. Aug. 21, 2026).*
Minor detours to the traffic stop, but all related to it, didn’t unreasonably extend the stop. The dog was quickly called for. United States v. Alba, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189133 (D. Utah Aug. 21, 2026). How the court handled the detours is instructive:
Posted inDog sniff, Reasonable suspicion|Comments Off on D.Utah: Minor time detours to writing up a traffic ticket didn’t unreasonable extend this stop; the dog was quickly on its way
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
