Under Michigan v. Summers and Maryland cases, defendant approaching a house being searched under a warrant could be detained. An explicit threat is not required. Fields v. State, 2012 Md. App. LEXIS 4 (February 2, 2012):
Michigan v. Summers and other cases have established that, when executing a search warrant, police officers may reasonably detain persons found in and about the premises for reasons of safety and to secure the premises being searched. While the particular issue presented by this case, viz., that the person detained was walking towards the premises being searched, is a matter of first impression in this State, our conclusion that the police acted reasonably in detaining appellant is fully consistent with Maryland law and supported by persuasive decisions from other jurisdictions.
. . .
We now return to the case before us. In his brief, Fields emphasizes that his initial interaction with the officers was cordial, so he could not reasonably have been perceived as a threat. He also points out that the officers left the house to meet him before he entered the premises, and implies that their action virtually eliminated him as a threat to the integrity of the ongoing search because he was stopped before actually reaching the house itself.
We are not persuaded that an apparently benign interaction removes the initial encounter in this case from the justifications set forth in Summers and Cotton. First, it is not at all clear that the officers "perceived" no threat. For example, Sergeant Thayer stated on cross-examination that "[t]here's a possibility" that Fields might have "potentially" had a weapon. Additionally, Fields's argument that he could not reasonably be perceived as a threat by the officers because he was in the yard, as opposed to at the house itself, is undermined by Williamson's rejection of the argument that the defendant in that case could not have been a threat to the officers because he was departing the house.
More importantly, a person who is subjected to a limited detention pursuant to Summers may not dictate the contours of the police response simply on the basis of good behavior. Indeed, a "perceived" threat is not a prerequisite for the detention authorized by Summers; instead, "[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation." Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03. Hence, the limited detention that is sanctioned by Summers does not depend on the presence of a threat, actual or perceived, to the officers executing the warrant.
WaPo: Beware of privacy policies: Time to clean up your digital footprint by Melissa Bell:
Last week, Google tracked the Web sites I visited and, like most technology companies, tried to guess who I was based on the places I visited. Its goal: to target advertising to me. The result? The search engine thought I was a 70-year-old man based in Atlanta.
I am not a man, not 70 and haven’t had the privilege of visiting the Peach State. Google’s guessing game might improve, though, thanks to a change in its privacy policies launched Wednesday. Now all the company’s products are governed by one policy, which lets the company track what I write on Gmail and compare it to what I watch on YouTube — all to better direct ads to me.
Why is facebook worth $75B? The information it has collected on 875M people.
When will the government start datamining to target people? It already can.
Officers asked defendant whether they could come through his gate to talk to him, and he agreed. That did not amount to consent to roam the curtilage or search the house. Ferrer v. State, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 1406 (Fla. App. 2d DCA February 3, 2012):
We reject the State's contention that once Ferrer open the locked gate, general "knock-and-talk" principles authorized the deputies to proceed to the front door area. See, e.g., State v. Navarro, 19 So. 3d 370, 372-73 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). The State argues that because the officers were free to proceed to the front door of the house to knock and talk, the evidence of marijuana was legally obtained under the "plain smell" doctrine. However, the facts of this case do not demonstrate the implied general consent to enter the curtilage of the house that provides the basis for entry to conduct a knock-and-talk investigation. Rather than leaving his property open for any member of the public to enter, Ferrer had taken steps to keep out uninvited visitors by fencing it and erecting an electric gate across his driveway, thereby demonstrating an expectation of privacy. Cf. Nieminski v. State, 60 So. 3d 521, 525-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (finding no violation of privacy where officers entered fenced property through a closed, but unlocked, gate). Thus, while officers were free to approach the gate to conduct a knock and talk—which they did—the area inside the fence fell under the same constitutional protections as the residence itself, and the officers were not at liberty, absent consent, to approach the residence. Compare Fernandez v. State, 63 So. 3d 881, 883-84 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the fenced yard adjacent to his residence and that the momentary opening of the gate to allow the defendant to leave was not an invitation for police to enter); with State v. Triana, 979 So. 2d 1039, 1045 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (finding no constitutional violation where the police had a consensual encounter with the defendant outside of the locked gate to the defendant's property and the defendant agreed to a search and opened the gate to allow the police to enter).
Because the government showed that the inventory was under an established policy, the inventory was valid. United States v. $677,660.00 in United States Currency, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12948 (N.D. Ohio February 2, 2012).*
Defendant’s driving 80 miles an hour on the wrong side of the road, trying to elude police, and then crashing the car and fleeing was probable cause to search the car. United States v. Christian, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12147 (N.D. Ga. January 5, 2012).*
Defendant got out of the vehicle searched, but he never alleged any facts that suggested that he had standing in the first place. United States v. Harris, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12976 (W.D. Ky. February 2, 2012).*
The CI’s tale here as similar to Draper, and that provided probable cause. United States v. Sanchez-Manzanarez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12757 (S.D. N.Y. February 2, 2012).*
I ignore 99% habeas cases because of Stone v. Powell coupled with AEDPA making them largely redundant since based on a pro se habeas petition, but occasionally one shows up worth reporting; but always a federal appeal:
2254 habeas petitioner had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate his search and seizure claim in state court, and the habeas court could not second guess it a decision and will not permit litigation of a defaulted claim. Fulcher v. Logan County Circuit Court, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1908, 2012 FED App. 0112N (6th Cir. January 31, 2012) (unpublished):
Upon review, we hold that Fulcher had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims in state court. As his primary argument, Fulcher asserts that the Kentucky State Police acted in bad faith in obtaining the August 3 search warrant, which he contends was not supported by probable cause. This precise issue, however, was addressed at trial and reviewed by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Fulcher II, 2007 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 45, 2007 WL 1536854, at *3-*4. Moreover, there is no evidence indicating that Fulcher's presentation of his claim was somehow frustrated. Accordingly, Fulcher's arguments before this court, which go to the "correctness" of the Kentucky Supreme Court's analysis, will not be considered. Riley, 674 F.2d at 526.
With regard to the July 24 search, Fulcher again asserts that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. This claim, like the first, is not cognizable on habeas review as Fulcher had a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate this claim in state court. Id. What's more, this claim is procedurally defaulted, as Fulcher failed to challenge the July 24 search on direct appeal and he may no longer assert the claim in state-court proceedings. Fulcher II, 2007 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 45, 2007 WL 1536854, at *3 n.1. Accordingly, the claim is barred.
Remember, the only exception to "full and fair" is ineffective assistance under Kimmelman v. Morrison.
Where a cell phone was seized under a search warrant, a separate search warrant was not required to search it under Ross. State v. White, 2011 W. Va. LEXIS 761 (February 10, 2011) [yes, a year ago]:
Accordingly, we now expressly hold that, when searching a vehicle pursuant to a valid search warrant, no additional search warrant is required to examine the contents of items that are properly seized in the execution of the warrant, including, but not limited to, cellular telephones. Applying this holding to the case at hand, we find the contents of the Motorola cellular telephone seized from Mr. Mahrous's yellow truck were properly examined by law enforcement officials. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Mr. White's motion to suppress evidence that was obtained as a result of that examination.
Defendant and the passengers were all out of the car and frisked after defendant was stopped. The officers articulated no reason to search the car. However, defendant consented to a dog search of the car, and that gave probable cause. United States v. Campbell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152725 (D. Me. December 6, 2011).*
After defendant was stopped, the officer told dispatch he was going to have to follow him to a checkpoint for a dog sniff. The district court erred in finding consent. The officer made it clear to the dispatcher, in defendant's presence, that he planned to take defendant to the checkpoint “to run the dog on him,” the officer obtained defendant’s verbal consent to follow him to the checkpoint while he was in the police cruiser, defendant was in the cruiser at the officer’s direction and each time he exited the cruiser, he obtained the officer’s permission, and the officer never advised defendant he was free to go or decline his invitation to follow him to the checkpoint. United States v. Zavala, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1887 (5th Cir. January 31, 2012) (unpublished).*
Defendant’s stop for a seatbelt violation was valid and with probable cause. His admissions thereafter were valid. United States v. Adams, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1781 (4th Cir. January 25, 2012) (unpublished).*
Defendant’s search claim was decided in the criminal case, so it couldn’t be brought up in the § 2255. United States v. Williams, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12593 (D. Ore. February 1, 2012).*
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by John Wesley Hall
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v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L. Ed. 2d 285, decided June 16 (ScotusBlog)
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v. New York, 131 S. Ct. 1387, 179 L. Ed. 2d 470, dismissed Mar. 29 (ScotusBlog)
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v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410, decided Dec. 7 (per curiam)
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v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694, decided Jan.
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"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays
down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its
application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect
results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at
bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping
government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having
and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that
the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and
safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."
—Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment.
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
—Pepé Le Pew
"There is never enough time, unless you are serving it."
—Malcolm Forbes
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)