Defendant waived on appeal his search issue by changing the issue, and it is important that trial courts get to rule on these issues first. To avoid an ineffective assistance claim, the court goes to the merits. Defendant's computer was lawfully seized under a search warrant for evidence of a homicide because it might have had evidence on it, even thought it was not listed in the search warrant and it was portable and found in defendant's car. A second search warrant was issued for the computer. People v. Varghese, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 683 (4th Dist. May 8, 2008).*

Officer had probable cause to believe defendant was selling drugs at the time of the arrest. It mattered not what drug the defendant was selling, just that he was selling drugs. Duncan v. State, 2008 Alas. App. LEXIS 47 (March 14, 2008).*

Initial entry into a car for an open beer bottle as "contraband" for violation of a local open container law was valid. Oldfield v. State, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 530 (May 7, 2008).*

There was probable cause for defendant's arrest in his car, so the search was proper under the automobile exception. United States v. Noble, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37184 (S.D. N.Y. May 7, 2008).*

Defendant's arrest in his home was not supported by exigent circumstances, and he opened the door on a command from the officers. Therefore, the entry and arrest violated Payton. United States v. Reeves, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 9808 (10th Cir. May 7, 2008).

The length of defendant's stop was not unreasonable. He consented while the officer was waiting for the computer check to come back, and the officer did not move him to the back of the patrol car until after he consented. United States v. Gonzalez, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 9787 (11th Cir. May 2, 2008) (unpublished).*

It is irrelevant that the defendant was not charged with the trafffic offense that led to his stop as long as there is probable cause for the stop. Here there was, and a search incident was proper. United States v. Mitchell, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37356 (S.D. Ga. May 7, 2008).*

Defendant was under surveillance and was seen retrieving a gun from behind bushes and getting into a taxicab which he had called. The cab changed lanes without signaling and the officer pulled it over. He got the passenger out and got consent from the driver. While defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cab, the court finds that Matlock on apparent authority to consent applies to taxicabs. The gun was found hidden under the floor mat. That showed defendant believed he had a reasonable expectation or privacy, but the cab driver had apparent authority to permit a search of the common interior. United States v. Harris, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 9814 (11th Cir. May 8, 2008) (Matlock previously applied to a vehicle in United States v. Dunkley, 911 F.2d 522, 525-26 (11th Cir. 1990)).

A Columbia University master's graduate and free lance reporter for the NY Post, through the NYCLU, has sued the NYPD claiming its stop-and-frisk practice promotes stops and frisks for "walking while black". Group's lawsuit challenges NYPD's stop-and-frisk policy, from AP:

A civil liberties group sued Wednesday in a challenge to the NYPD's practice of stopping hundreds of thousands of people each year for questioning, saying it is racially biased.

The New York Civil Liberties Union lawsuit lists New York Post reporter Leonardo Blair as the sole plaintiff, saying he was stopped and frisked by police officers as he walked from his car to his Bronx home last November.

He was taken to a police station, where officers expressed surprise that though he was black, he was not from "the projects," the lawsuit said. Blair, 28, has a master's degree from Columbia University.

The lawsuit, filed in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, said the NYPD has stopped people in New York nearly a million times over the past two years under the practice. It said more than half of the people targeted were black, even though blacks make up only about a quarter of the city's population.

NY Times article here.

Annhydrous ammonia leak is not exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry into defendant's garage. State v. Moore, 2008 NMCA 56, 2008 N.M. App. LEXIS 25 (March 19, 2008):

[*14] Our cases therefore establish that mere probable cause that a methamphetamine lab exists is not per se an exigent circumstance that will justify a warrantless entry into a home. Police officers must still have knowledge of specific, articulable facts that demonstrate that immediate action is necessary "to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence." Copeland, 105 N.M. at 31, 727 P.2d at 1346; see State v. Duffy, 1998 NMSC 14, P 70, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807 ("[T]he presence of exigent circumstances must be supported by specific articulable facts."), modified on other grounds by State v. Gallegos, 2007 NMSC 7, P 17, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828.

N.M. "misdemeanor arrest rule does not apply to investigatory stops. We further hold that, under the Fourth Amendment, the stop was reasonable because an officer may reasonably rely on information from another officer that a crime has been or is being committed. Because the Court of Appeals improperly relied on New Mexico's misdemeanor arrest rule, we reverse the Court of Appeals opinion and remand to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the stop was pretextual and, if so, whether article II, section 10 prohibits pretextual stops." This was a stop for a seatbelt violation. State v. Ochoa, 2008 NMSC 23, 2008 N.M. LEXIS 243 (April 8, 2008).

Arresting plaintiff outside her house for the benefit of TV cameras obviated the need for a protective sweep. Milligan v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36635 (M.D. Tenn. May 2, 2008).*

Factual disputes remain in question of excessive force in a tear gassing in going in for a barricaded suspect. Whether tear gassing was even required in this situation was questionable because negotiations were going on. Also, defendant was seized by surrounding his house. Estate of Rudy Escobedo v. City of Fort Wayne, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36852 (N.D. Ind. May 5, 2008).*

Recognizing the presumption of unreasonableness of a search of a home, the officer here had defendant's consent to enter in a DUI case. Twp. of Bainbridge v. Kaseda, 2008 Ohio 2136, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1843 (11th Cir. May 2, 2008).*

Computer check that produced an outstanding warrant on the owner is reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Dickson, 2008 Mo. App. LEXIS 636 (May 6, 2008).*

An appeals court can apply the inevitable discovery doctrine on its own motion. Inevitable discovery is similar to harmless error. State v. Dickinson, 2008 MT 159, 2008 Mont. LEXIS 229 (May 6, 2008):

[*P20] As indicated above, the parties did not argue to the District Court or to this Court the "inevitable discovery" doctrine. And while we acknowledge that we do not traditionally address legal theories not raised by the parties, there are limited analyses in which this Court frequently engages, even if the parties have not urged us to do so. A classic example is the "harmless error" analysis, which is similar to the inevitable discovery exception. In the typical "harmless error" situation, a defendant argues that a claimed error requires reversal, and in response the State asserts that no error occurred. Even if the State fails to argue the fallback position that if error occurred, it was harmless, we will still engage in the harmless error analysis in the event we conclude that an error was made, for the simple reason that we have everything in the record we need to make that determination, and a refusal to make the analysis would unnecessarily multiply the proceedings (e.g., remand for determination of whether the error was harmless, followed by a second appeal). The situation before us is similar in that Dickinson argues the court erred in failing to suppress the evidence and the State maintains it did not.

[*P21] While we have no cases which categorically state that we will apply the "inevitable discovery" doctrine sua sponte, it appears we did so in Pearson. Pearson argued that a police officer performed an illegal search resulting in the discovery of marijuana. This gave the officer probable cause to obtain a warrant to search Pearson's car, at which time cocaine was discovered. Pearson sought to have evidence of the cocaine suppressed on the ground that the original search was unlawful and the subsequently-discovered evidence was tainted. However, we held that other "plain view" evidence of illegal drug activity provided probable cause for a warrant under which the cocaine would have been "inevitably discovered."