Being suspected of being a drug dealer is not enough to show nexus to defendant’s home, but the facts required to show nexus apparently aren’t much, as long as there is a "fair probability" they point to drugs in the house. United States v. Jeffries, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1374, 2012 FED App. 0082N (6th Cir. January 24, 2012):

For similar reasons, we reject Calloway's argument that there was no nexus between the cocaine found in the Lincoln in Louisiana and his home on Oakburn Lane. That Calloway was suspected of being a drug dealer would not have been, by itself, sufficient to establish probable cause to search his home. See McPhearson, 469 F.3d at 525 n.3. But "where the allegation of drug dealing is coupled with independently corroborated information from police officers, it may be sufficient to establish probable cause." Id. The affidavit at hand was replete with corroborating information: the Lincoln was often seen at the Oakburn residence, was sometimes operated by Calloway, was seen at the Oakburn residence immediately before leaving Louisville for Texas, and was interdicted in Louisiana. And once again, Calloway had been seen removing trash from the premises, had associated with a known felon on the premises, and had a prior drug felony history himself. Thus, there was a "fair probability" that evidence of drug activity would be found at Calloway's residence, and the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant was sufficient.

On a controlled delivery of a package of heroin by FedEx, officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant when he left the house. His evasive driving, in reverse, added to it. United States v. Smith, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1361, 2012 FED App. 0083N (6th Cir. January 24, 2012) (unpublished).*

Eighth Circuit joins majority of circuits and holds that the plaintiff in a § 1983 action for a warrantless arrest or search bears the burden of production, proof, and persuasion that no exception applies. [Omitted is fn.2 with a lot of citations.] Der v. Connolly, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1338 (8th Cir. January 25, 2012):

Instead, as the district court correctly noted, this court “has not expressly decided who bears the burden of proof in a § 1983 action for a warrantless arrest or search.” Der, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112748, 2011 WL 31498, at *2. We do so now. Two views currently prevail among our sister circuits. A majority of the circuits place the burden of proof on the plaintiff in a § 1983 action for a warrantless arrest or search, with some of those circuits imposing the burden of production on the defendant. A minority of the circuits place the burden of proof on the defendant in a § 1983 action. See, e.g., Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating, in the context of a § 1983 action, “[t]he officers bear the burden of establishing that the threats posed exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry”); Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp., 461 F.3d 646, 655 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding the government bears the burden of proving the presence of exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry); Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996) (“To excuse the absence of a warrant, the burden rests on the State to show the existence of [exigent circumstances].”); Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 980-81 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that school officials bore the burden of demonstrating a student’s voluntary relinquishment of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches in light of the “presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights”); Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 909 (3d Cir. 1984) (commenting that, in a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, the “defendants bear the burden at trial of proving the defense of good faith and probable cause”).

Having reviewed the relevant case authority, we agree with the majority of our sister circuits’ “formulation of the proper allocation of the parties’ burdens in a section 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.” Valance, 110 F.3d at 1279. We have previously recognized that “plaintiffs ordinarily retain the burden of proof throughout the trial” in a suit “brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104, 1117 (8th Cir. 1977). Thus, “employing a criminal burden of proof [in a § 1983 civil action] is contrary to established principles governing civil trials, namely, that the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion must remain squarely on the plaintiff.” Bogan, 644 F.3d at 570 (quotations and citations omitted). As the Seventh Circuit explained, “[e]ven if a presumption of unreasonableness arises from the fact of a warrantless search [or entry], that does not serve in a civil case to shift ‘the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion.’” Valance, 110 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 301). Instead, such “presumption merely serves to impose on the defendant ‘the burden of going forward with evidence to meet or rebut the presumption.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 301). A defendant may satisfy this burden of production by “produc[ing] evidence of consent or of some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 1278. “Yet once the defendant has done so, ‘the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion must remain squarely on the plaintiff in accordance with established principles governing civil trials.’” Id. (quoting Ruggiero, 928 F.2d at 563).

A search and seizure § 1983 claim accrues on the date of the search. One can’t wait until after reversal on appeal to sue if it ran in the meantime. Here, the suit would be barred by qualified immunity. Rollin v. Cook, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1313 (9th Cir. January 23, 2012) (unpublished).*

Eleven month delay in getting a search warrant in a child pornography case was not stale as a matter of law, since the Fifth Circuit has upheld an 18 month delay. United States v. Baker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7949 (S.D. Tex. January 20, 2012).*

Officers’ hot pursuit of two fleeing suspects into this house justified their entry. The facts here are more compelling than Warden v. Hayden where SCOTUS approved of the hot pursuit doctrine. United States v. Davis, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7925 (S.D. Fla. January 17, 2012).*

While the description of the driver was somewhat off, the car was identified by a witness as a stolen car, and that was at least reasonable suspicion for a stop. After the car was stopped, defendant fled from it. He did nothing to assert a possessory interest in the car for the two weeks he had it until he was arrested, and that was too little, too late. United States v. Poole, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152104 (E.D. Tex. December 30, 2011)*:

Poole apparently argues that he had a possessory interest in the vehicle because Gordon allegedly gave him the vehicle when they stopped dating two weeks prior to the traffic stop. He did not, however, assert his possessory interest to the law enforcement officers prior to the search of the vehicle. See United States v. Riazco, 91 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 1996). Instead, Poole chose to run when Deputy Hall attempted to arrest him. He never returned to the vehicle. Poole was located and arrested four days later. Even if the Court were to assume that Poole had a legal possessory interest in the vehicle, his decision to flee the scene and not return resulted in a voluntary abandonment of the vehicle. A defendant has no standing to complain about the search of property that he voluntarily abandons. United States v. Quiroz-Hernandez, 48 F.3d 858, 864 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc). As set forth above, the initial stop and attempted arrest of Poole were proper, rendering Poole's abandonment of the vehicle voluntary and not influenced by improper police conduct. Id.; see also United States v. Alvarez, 6 F.3d 287, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1993). Poole's challenge to the search of the vehicle is without merit.

Such was the case yesterday here. Ark. Democrat-Gazette: Attempted drug robbery leaves one man shot by David Harten.

The usual scenario is that the guy shot in the leg would never tell the police what earned his bullet wound. Likely he wouldn't be back to attempt the same thing on his victim since he knows the victim is armed. Calling the police to report the aggravated robbery of the drug stash here would, and did, net the robbery victim charges of possession with intent to deliver and maybe "maintaining a drug premises" (something I still don't get). Here it says possession of a weapon, which is his right in his home. It could have been simultaneous possession of guns and drugs (not a good thing). Does the Second Amendment guarantee a right to protect your stash if it's in your home? I don't think SCOTUS will even go that far.

Defendant was stopped for a traffic light violation, and they already had reasonable suspicion defendant was armed because of a gang murder they thought they could connect him to. Therefore, the order out of the car and frisk were reasonable. United States v. Martinez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7019 (D. Mass. January 23, 2012).*

Based on the suppression hearing record, the USMJ had all he needed to find the consent voluntary, and defense counsel was not ineffective for not subpoenaing other witnesses for the hearing. United States v. Chacon, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7596 (D. Nev. January 23, 2012).*

While there were contradictions in the officers’ testimony about the cause for defendant’s arrest by the Street Narcotics Enforcement Unit, the court finds there as still probable cause, and the motion to suppress is denied. United States v. Vasquez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7280 (E.D. N.Y. January 23, 2012), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130543 (E.D.N.Y., Nov. 10, 2011).*

Where an illegal search makes other evidence the government has appear more relevant, the exclusionary rule would not be applied to the other evidence. The costs outweigh the benefits. United States v. Fofana, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1263, 2012 FED App. 0018P (6th Cir. January 24, 2012):

As a result of a presumably illegal airport search, the Government learned that Fode Fofana used “Ousmane Diallo” as an alias. Identification bearing Diallo’s name was previously used to open two bank accounts, through which Fofana allegedly committed bank fraud. In Fofana’s federal bank fraud case, the district court suppressed any evidence bearing Diallo’s name, and the Government appeals that order. Although the actual documentation seized during the search must be suppressed, evidence obtained legally and independently of the search is not suppressible, even if the Government cannot show that it would have discovered its significance without the illegal search. Under the facts of this case, the minimal deterrent effect of suppression is far outweighed by the sweeping burden on the truth-seeking function of the courts.

. . .

There is a difference between evidence that the Government obtains because of knowledge illegally acquired, and evidence properly in the Government’s possession that it learns the relevance of because of knowledge illegally acquired. It may be that the latter must be suppressed in some cases. But in the context of the present case, bank records and other evidence that the Government obtained independently of the airport search do not have to be suppressed on account of the unconstitutionality of that search, merely because the relevance or usefulness of that evidence became apparent because of the search.

The reasoning behind this conclusion is strongly supported by case law, although the precise combination of circumstances appears to be unprecedented. First, the actual documents whose suppression is at issue—the bank records reflecting the fraud—were in the possession of the Government entirely free of illegal means. Secondly, the illegal search was not directed to the crime, or even the type of crime, for which the discovered information turned out to be useful, thereby eliminating much of the deterrent effect of suppression in this case. Third, an alternate, more direct deterrent to such searches is clearly present, in the form of excluding the passports from evidence. Fourth, exclusion of the bank records in this case unduly burdens the truth-seeking function of courts by effectively precluding relevant and legitimately obtained evidence from ever being used.